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ARTICLES

TOWARDS A SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY OF LAW:
LESSONS FROM COLLABORATIVE
REPRODUCTION
Jason Mazzone*

I. INTRODUCTION

Visiting the United States in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the success of American democracy
was largely explained by the prevalence of civic associations
that linked citizens together.! In small-scale associations, de
Tocqueville argued, citizens learn to participate meaningfully
in democratic processes, thereby avoiding concentration of
power in a central government. Furthermore, involvement
in voluntary associations greatly enhances the quality of
community life by tempering individualism and facilitating
cooperation for collective benefit.3 No government, in de Tocqueville's view, could achieve the same goals as citizens acting together in a vibrant civic sphere.4 "If the inhabitants of
democratic countries," he concluded, "did not learn.., some
habits of acting together in the affairs of daily life, civilization itself would be in peril .... [K]nowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge; on its pro-

* Law Clerk to Judge Robert Sack, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. A.B. Harvard College (1993), A.M. Stanford University (1994),
J.D. Harvard Law School (1997). My thanks to Elizabeth Bartholet, Michael
Melcher, Robert Putnam, and Laurence Tribe.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-17 (J.P. Mayer
ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1835).
2. Id. at 189-95.

3. Id. at 513-17.
4. Id. at 515.
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gress depends that of all others."5
Contemporary social scientists have marshaled empirical
evidence in support of this basic idea, demonstrating that
strong social ties among individuals are critical for the wellbeing of communities. 6 The success of schools, the pace of
economic development, the effectiveness of local government
and even the physical and mental health of citizens, as well
as the prevalence of negative social phenomena such as
crime, poverty, unemployment and drug use, are all influenced by the quality of social connections.7
In a variety of ways, law regulates social relationships.
Marriage, contracts, torts, duties, agency, adoption and
commercial partnerships are all areas in which law governs
relationships between and among individuals. While law
regulates social ties, does it also strengthen them in ways
that produce collective benefits?' This article introduces a
new method to evaluate and orient legal regulation. It proposes that since social connections are so important for
healthy communities, law's effectiveness should be measured
by its success at preserving and promoting social ties.
To demonstrate this method of legal analysis, this article
considers law's success in its regulation of one particular area
of modern life-the family. It proposes that effective legal
regulation of family is regulation that protects and promotes
social ties for collective benefits. This article thus evaluates
law's treatment of the family and asks whether and how law
might better serve our common interests, in its definitions
and regulations of family relationships, by adhering to a
framework that emphasizes the importance of social ties.9
This article focuses on collaborative reproduction, which is
defined as arrangements in which someone other than one's
partner provides gametes or gestation necessary for repro-

5. Id. at 514-17.
6. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, Revisited, THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Spring 1995, at 18-20.
7. See id.
8. By collective benefits I mean simply benefits to the community at large
as distinguished from benefits to individuals or small groups of people.
(Similarly, by collective interests I mean the interests of the general community.) Crime control, for example, benefits everybody (even if some benefit from
it more than others).
9. See infra Part II.
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duction. ° Examples of collaborative reproduction include
sperm, egg or embryo donation and surrogate motherhood.1 1
By focusing on a narrow and relatively new realm in which
the law regulates and determines family relationships, this
article establishes a basis for broader thinking.
Collaborative reproduction has an important advantage
over other areas in family law for explaining the theory of
this article. While in other areas of family law, such as divorce, custody and adoption, there is a broadly understood (if
disputed) idea of traditional family norms, collaborative reproduction makes uncertain the very application of these
norms. Collaborative reproduction moves from an ideal of a
married man and woman giving birth to and raising their genetic child to an elaborate, often commercial, arrangement in
which as many as five adults could claim, based on different
connections, to be a child's parent." In collaborative reproduction the way to define family relationships is suddenly
open to debate. Collaborative reproduction means, for example, that a woman can give birth to a child who shares none
of her genes. But then who-the provider of the egg or the
woman who gestates and gives birth-is the child's mother?
Collaborative reproduction allows a lesbian couple to obtain
sperm from an anonymous male and raise a child together.
Does their child have a father, and if so, what rights does he
have? Collaborative reproduction also means that couples
can hire surrogates to do the work of pregnancy. If the
agreement turns sour, should the surrogate be allowed to
keep the baby intended for somebody else? Because these
questions have no obvious answers, collaborative reproduction frees us from many preconceptions about family life and
allows us to think more prospectively and imaginatively
about how law's regulation of the family can serve our common interests.
Therefore, collaborative reproduction is a useful area to
focus upon when considering law's regulation of family because, by its very nature, it unhitches us from the numbing

10. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 119 (1994).
11. See id.
12. See John L. Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"?The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991)
("These include a sperm donor, an egg donor, a surrogate or gestational host,
and two non-biologically related individuals who intend to raise the child.").-
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comfort of tradition and so forces us to think constructively
and creatively about how law is to benefit collective life. The
detailed discussion of collaborative reproduction in this article should not, however, be mistaken for a discussion that is
primarily about collaborative reproduction. The purpose is
not merely to propose appropriate legal regulation of various
methods of collaborative reproduction. The goal remains
much broader-one of understanding how effectively law
meets our common needs in its regulation of the family in a
variety of contexts. Collaborative reproduction is only a tool
to help us think clearly about legal regulation of the family to
promote those common needs."
Part II provides a framework through which the starting
point of this article is conceptualized and reinforced: social
connections serve our collective interests and should be promoted. That framework is one of social capital.4 This article
uses social capital simply as a means to express the importance of social ties, that is, as a means to articulate the goal
that law should pursue. Therefore, the discussion does not
dwell on theories of social capital, much less seek to contribute to an understanding of how social connections translate
into collective goods. Rather, because the importance of generating social capital is the premise of the analysis, the discussion is limited to an introduction of the term as it has already been elucidated by social scientists, and a brief
consideration of the specific type of social capital that is most
relevant to this article.
Part III considers three models for legal regulation of
family relationships in collaborative reproduction."
Each
model is evaluated on the basis of its success at promoting
the social connections that benefit collective life. The first
model is one of shared parenting, in which law recognizes all
13. Therefore, this article takes no position on the desirability of permitting
or banning various types of collaborative reproduction.
14. For the classical treatment of the term see JAMES S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21 (1990).
15. The selection of models reflects the range of proposals that have been
made by legal commentators for determining parenthood and family ties in
collaborative reproduction. No model, however, exactly replicates any particular proposal in the academic literature. Rather, the models typify recurring
ideas and thus can be seen as "ideal types" of regulation. See 1 MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 19-22 (Geunther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim
Fischoffet. al. trans., 1978) (1947).
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of the individuals involved in collaborative reproduction as
having a familial relationship with the child produced. The
second model is one of biological ties, in which law bases its
recognition of family relationships and its assignment of parental rights on biological connections. The third model is
one of contract and intent, in which law simply adopts the
expressed choices of participants involved in collaborative reproduction to determine the resulting familial relationships
and parental rights.
This article asserts that none of these models of legal
regulation succeed in protecting and promoting social relationships for collective benefit. In other words, each model
proves unsuitable for generating social capital. However, the
analysis and rejection of these models yields three principles
necessary for law to build strong social ties in its regulation
of family relationships. We find that social capital that
strengthens communities is built where law promotes (1) a
variety of family ties that are (2) voluntarily entered by individuals, and where (3) law regulates the content or terms of
family relationships once they are created.
Finally, Part IV uses these three principles from collaborative reproduction for a general analysis of legal regulation
of the family. The principles provide a way to evaluate law's
treatment of familial relationships in various contexts. To
demonstrate the value of these principles, they are applied to
several illustrative examples of legal regulation of the family,
and in each case they suggest how law might be redirected to
better serve our common interests.
II. SOCIAL CAPITAL

A. Social Capital Generally
Researchers who have demonstrated the importance of
social connections to healthy communities have developed the
concept of social capital as a way to discuss and explain their
findings.16 A thorough discussion of the theory of social capi16. See COLEMAN, supra note 14; Putnam, supra note 6, at 20.

Coleman

provides a functional definition of social capital:
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a
variety of different entities having two characteristics in common:
They all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate
certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other
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tal is beyond the scope of this article, but the basic concept
may be understood by analogy to other forms of capital.
Whereas physical capital (e.g., tools) and human capital (e.g.,
education) increase individual productivity, social capital refers to features of social organization, such as networks,
norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. 7 Social capital may exist in a
number of forms. Participating in a PTA creates social capital, as does attending a town meeting, sharing gardening
tools, helping a child with homework, singing in a choir or
having coffee with a friend. In each case, the resulting networks and norms build trust and allow for future cooperation
among participants. Social capital provides a resource, which
individuals might use to pursue their own goals. 8 But more
importantly, social capital produces positive externalities for
communities as a whole, such as less crime, better schools,
economic growth and healthy citizens. 9 Political scientist,
Robert Putnam, has argued at length that the quality of public life largely depends on the stock of social capital in a
community.0 Putnam's summary of the basic theory of the
forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the
achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence .... Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the
structure of relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged
neither in individuals nor in physical implements of production.
COLEMAN, supra note 14, at 302.
17. See Putnam, supra note 6, at 20.
18. Social capital is a resource in the same way a tool (physical capital) or a
law degree (human capital) are resources. Social networks help individuals do
things. Finding a job, for example, is greatly facilitated by knowing others who
can relay opportunities or provide recommendations. Or, to take another example, painting a house is easier if friends come over to help.
19. See Putnam, supra note 6, at 18-20.
20. Id. at 18-21. Putnam's own focus has been the role of social capital in
the success of local political and economic institutions. Based on findings from
a twenty-year study of sub-national governments in different regions of Italy,
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993), Putnam reports that norms and networks of civic engagement
powerfully affect the performance of representative government: "Voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and in football
clubs-these were the hallmarks of a successful region." Putnam, supra note 6,
at 19-20. Putnam has demonstrated that the level of social capital in the
United States has been declining over the past few decades as people have disengaged from various civic organizations and activities. Id. at 21-29; Robert D.
Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital
in America, The 1995 Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture, Address before the American
Political Science Association 3-5 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Putnam, Tuning In,
Tuning Out]. This decline, Putnam suggests, has serious consequences for the
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way that social connections translate into collective benefits
is instructive:
For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community
blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. In the
first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy
norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination
and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow
dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are
reduced. At the same time, networks of civic engagement
embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a
cultural template for future collaboration. Finally, dense
networks of interaction probably broaden the participants'
sense of self, developing the "I" into the "we,"
or ...enhancing the participants' "taste" for collective
benefits.2 '
The core message of social capital theory thus may be
stated in the following way: networks of social relationships
serve the collective good.
B. Family Social Capital
Social capital in the family exists in the relations between children, parents and other members of the family
unit.2 2 The amount of social capital present in families can
vary widely. Families with strong ties that extend to grandparents, aunts and uncles are rich in social capital.22 Individuals living alone with just occasional contact with distant
relatives enjoy only low levels of family social capital.24 While
divorce reduces social capital, 5 families small in size, such as
one adult and a child, may embody high social capital if the
members have a close relationship, spend large amounts of
time with each other and frequently engage in shared activi-

quality of American life. Putnam, supra note 6, at 18-21.
21. Putnam, supra note 6, at 20.
22. See James S. Coleman, The Creationand Destruction of Social Capital:
Implications for the Law, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 375, 384
(1988).
23. See id. at 385.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 386.
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ties.2" Family social capital creates two types of benefits: (1)
benefits to individuals and (2) collective benefits to the community as a whole.
1. Individual Benefits
Family social capital can greatly benefit individual family members. High levels of social capital in families correlate with fewer behavioral problems among children,27 higher
educational achievement,2 8 lower drop-out rates 29 and greater
chances for children's long-term success. 30 In sum, because of
the important role that social capital plays in child development and socialization,
human capital can be irrelevant to outcomes for children ... if parents are not an important part of their children's lives or if their human capital is employed exclusively at work or elsewhere outside the home .... That is,
if the human capital possessed by parents is not complemented by the social capital embodied in family relations,
the human capital of the parents becomes irrelevant to the

26. See id. at 385.
27. See Frank Furstenberg Jr. & Julien 0. Teitler, Reconsideringthe Effects
of Marital Disruption: What Happens to Children of Divorce in Early Adulthood?, 15 J. FAM. IssuEs 173 (1994); Toby L. Parcel & Elizabeth G. Menaghan,
Family Social Capital and Children'sBehavior Problems, 56 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q.
120 (1993); James Peterson & Nicholas Zeill, Marital Disruption, Parent-Child
Relationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 295
(1986).
28. See Coleman, supra note 22, at 385 (reporting on social capital exemplified by Asian immigrant parents purchasing a second copy of school textbooks
for the mother to study in order to more effectively help her child do well in
school).
29. See id. at 380 (reporting that even when human capital and financial
capital within a family are great, dropout rates of children from families with
lower social capital-single-parent households, parents who have both worked
before the child was in school, and families in which children report little communication with their parents on personal matters-are higher than are dropout rates for children without these deficiencies).
30. See, e.g., Gay C. Kitson & Leslie A. Morgan, The Multiple Consequences
of Divorce: A Decade Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913 (1990) (reporting that
children of divorce are less likely to obtain the level of education they would
have obtained had their parents remained married); Sara McLanahan & Karen
Booth, Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, and Politics, 51 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 557, 558 (1989) (reporting that children from mother-only
families obtain fewer years of education, are more likely to drop out of high
school, and are more likely to have lower income and themselves live in poverty
as adults than children from dual-parent families).
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child's educational growth."'
For adults too, family social capital can have important
returns. Long-term family relationships often provide a solid
source of emotional and practical support." Empirical studies have shown that support from family members is of a special quality, rarely matched by support from even close
friends.3" A decade of research on marriage and health demonstrates that social capital embodied in family relationships
also has significant implications for the health and psychological well-being of individual family members. "Marriage is
associated with physical health, psychological well-being and
low mortality. Compared to people who are divorced, separated, single or widowed, the married have better overall
well-being. This overall positive effect is strong and consistent."34 Being married is associated with less anxiety, lower
mortality, less heart disease, fewer strokes, fewer accidents,
better resistance to cancer, less depression, a healthier diet,
fewer fights, less drinking and a lower chance of suicide.3 5
Simply living with another person does not capture these
benefits, being married is what matters. 6 Nor are these effects just a result of the greater economic security and increased support that come from marriage: marriage provides
a different kind of social support, one that is unavailable in
other contexts. 7 Simply stated, individuals who can draw on
31. Coleman, supra note 22, at 384 (emphasis added).
32. Family members can lend money, provide advice, baby-sit on short notice, share job leads, cushion the effects of tragedy, invest in a business, clean
house, and arrange weddings. Families often represent an unusually deep
network of trust that allows even distant relatives to coordinate in the pursuit
of goals. Family social capital may be generated just by virtue of there being a
family in place-a collection of people related by birth or marriage-without the
same need for long-term exchanges and trust-building that social capital in
groups of strangers may require. Individuals may also be able to tap family social capital even when they themselves have been untrustworthy in the past:
violations of social codes by family members may be more easily forgotten or
forgiven.
33. See Michael Walker et al., Statistical Models for Social Support Networks, in ADVANCES IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (Stanley Wasserman & Joseph Galaskiewicz eds., 1994) (reporting that parent-child ties are so broadly
supportive that even weaker, but still active parent-child ties are able to provide almost as much support as intimate friendship ties).
34. Catherine E. Ross et al., The Impact of the Family on Health: The Decade in Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1059, 1061 (1990).
35. See id. at 1061-62.
36. See id. at 1062.
37. See id. at 1065. See also Choi K. Wann et al., The RelationshipBetween
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family social capital are healthier, happier and have more
reliable sources of practical and emotional support.
2. Collective Benefits
Besides its importance to individuals,3 8 family social
capital also benefits the community as a whole.3 ' Because of
these considerable social benefits, promoting family social
capital is a goal that law should pursue. There are at least
four reasons family social capital matters for the well-being
of communities.
First, family social capital has implications for levels of
other forms of social capital. Accounting for education, age,
race and other factors, single people , i.e. those who are divorced, separated or never married, are significantly less
civicly engaged than are married people." Trust is a useful
indicator of the level of social capital, and single people are
less trusting.4 Furthermore, single-parenthood also disrupts
social capital. As a result of marital disruption, singlemother families have higher rates of residential mobility and,
therefore, less contact with neighbors than do families
headed by married couples." Finally, there is also evidence
that mother-only families are less likely to be found in neighborhoods that provide strong social support and guard
Social Support and Life Satisfaction as a Function of Family Structure, 58 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 502 (1996) (reporting that social support from a spouse is the
primary correlate of life satisfaction for married adults and that, at least for
married women, emotional support from family members is more critical for life
satisfaction than support from others such as friends).
38. The importance of social capital for individuals is of course not isolated
from its importance to the community: where low social capital means behavioral problems among children, reduced educational opportunities and success,
increased poverty, and unhealthy citizens, there is a substantial cost that we
collectively bear.
39. Indeed, it seems clear that no other institution is capable of generating
the same social capital benefits. See Coleman, supra note 22, at 398 ("[Tlhe
withering away of the family as the principal agent for the socialization of children is not paralleled by the growth of another institution with the incentive to
make investments that aid the growth and development of children."); David
Popenoe, American Family Decline: 1960-1990, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 527,
539 (1993) ("There is strong reason to believe ...that the family is by far the
best institution to carry out [the functions of child-rearing and providing affection and companionship]... and that insofar as these functions are shifted to
other institutions, they will not be carried out as well.").
40. See Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra note 20, at 12.
41. See id.
42. See McLanahan & Booth, supra note 30, at 561.
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against poverty and deviance.4"
Second, the level of family social capital may influence
the effectiveness of other forms of social capital. If parentchild relationships embody little social capital, then even
high levels of parent-parent interaction at a community level
may be undermined and their potential social capital benefits
diminished. Low-levels of family social capital, for instance,
may mean that social norms that control crime do not permeate down through the family to the level of the child. Alternatively, families with an absent parent may be disconnected
from social networks that transmit information about employment opportunities. In each case, the usual benefits of
high social capital at the community level are not realized.
Third, social capital that is generated in the family can
be used by others outside the family to achieve their own
goals. That is, family social capital produces positive externalities. For example, stronger parent-child relationships
may result in schools being provided with extra tuition and,
therefore, reduce the workload of teachers. Or, my friend can
enlist the help of my sister even if the two are strangers.
Family social capital thus affects not just the goals of those
located within the family but of others who draw on family
networks for their own benefit.
Fourth, the level of family social capital today has an
impact on family social capital tomorrow, because low-levels
of family social capital seem to be inherited. Children from
mother-only families are more likely to marry early, have
children early and have children outside of marriage than are
children from dual-parent homes."' Children from motheronly families are also more likely to divorce,45 as are children
who start out in dual-parent families but whose parents subsequently divorce.46 Children of divorce are also more cautious about marriage47 and less trusting of future spouses,48
and young women whose parents have divorced are less
43. See id. at 568.
44. See id. at 565.
45. See id.
46. See Kitson & Morgan, supra note 30, at 920.
47. See Norval D. Glenn & Kathryn B. Kramer, The Marriages and Divorces of the Children of Divorce, 49 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 811, 813 (1987).
48. See Kathryn M. Franklin et al., Long-Term Impact of ParentalDivorce
on Optimism and Trust: Changes in General Assumptions or Narrow Beliefs?,
59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 743 (1990).
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trusting of men in general.49

3. DecliningFamily Social Capital
The need for law to protect and promote family social
capital is more urgent today given the evidence that levels of
family social capital have been declining. ° There has been a
clear loosening of family ties in the past few decades."' Indeed, people have been foregoing not just nuclear families but
family relationships altogether." The sharp increase in divorce during the last four decades is well documented." Divorce is now so prevalent that the likelihood a marriage begun in 1990 will end in divorce or separation is estimated to
be as high as 60%." Divorce is also much more acceptable:
less than one-fifth of the population currently believe that
parents should stay together for the sake of children.55
Either because of divorce or their parents never marrying, most American children spend part of their childhood in
a single-parent family.56 The chance that a child will live
with a single parent at some point is 70% for white children
49. See Suzanne Southworth & J. Conrad Schwarz, Post-Divorce Contact,
Relationships with Father,and Heterosexual Trust in Female College Students,
57 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 371, 372 (1987).
50. Of course, law is not the only remedy for decreased social capital. But,
as the remainder of this article will show, because law has important effects on
levels of social capital it can play a significant role in reform.
51. In considering changes in family ties over this period, it is important to
recognize that some of these changes have been going on for much longer
(divorce, for example, has been on the rise for more than one hundred years); at
the same time, however, recent changes are remarkable because they represent
a sharp acceleration in trends. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 529-30.
52. See id. at 535-37.
53. There are various ways of measuring this change. In number of divorces per 1000 existing marriages, the rate increased from nine in 1960 to 21
in 1987. See id. at 531. The number of divorced people in the population quadrupled over the same period. See id. at 531-32. For white women, the likelihood that their marriage would end in divorce rose from 20% in 1960 to 45% by
1980. See id. In 1867, when divorce statistics were first recorded, the rate was
0.3 per 1,000 population; it has since risen by a factor of more than 17. See
Paul C. Glick & Sung-Ling Lin, Recent Changes in Divorce and Remarriage,48
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 737, 738 (1986). The largest increase occurred between
1965 and 1981 when the rate reached a level of 5.3. See id. There was a gradual decline in divorce during the 1980s; in 1984 the rate was 4.9 per 1,000
population. See id.
54. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 532.
55. See David A. Hamburg, The New Family: Investing in Human Capital,
CURRENT, July-Aug. 1993, at 4; Popenoe, supra note 39, at 532.
56. See Hamburg, supra note 55, at 4.
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born in 1980 (up from 19% for children born between 1950
and 1954). 7 For African American children the chances are
now 94% (up from 48%)." In 1960, 88% of children lived with
two parents; by 1989 the figure had dropped to 73%.59 Over
the same period, the figure for children living with two natural parents, both married only once, dropped from 73% to
56%.6" The number of children currently living with a single
parent has risen from 9% of all children in 1960 to 24% today.61 Almost half of children whose parents are married see
their parents divorce by the time they reach age sixteen,"
and it often takes five years or more for their mothers to remarry."3 Almost half of all white children whose parents remarry see the second marriage end before they reach adulthood.6 Furthermore, African American women marry less
often, experience more marital disruption, and remarry more
slowly and less often than white women.65 In addition, we
now have the highest recorded rate of out-of-wedlock births: a
quarter of all children born, representing a massive increase
Amerifrom just 5% in 1960.66 Sixty-two percent of African
67
marriage.
outside
can children are currently born
6
There has been a "widespread retreat from marriage."
Young women today marry on average four years later than
did their mothers.6 9

From 1960 to 1990 the proportion of

women aged twenty to twenty-four who had never married
increased from 28.4% to 62.8%; for women aged twenty-five
to twenty-nine the change was from 10.5% to 31.1%.7"
Women born in the late 1930s (reaching marriage age around
1960) had a 97% probability of getting married at some point;
women born in 1983 face a likelihood of 90%.71 For college-

57. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 531.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Hamburg, supra note 55, at 5.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 532.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id. See also Hamburg, supra note 55, at 4 (reporting that Americans today are more likely than ever before to postpone marriage).
70. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 532.
71. See id. at 532-33.
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educated women the figure is even lower (80%) and it is
lower still for African American women (75%).72

Whereas

marriage was once seen "as a social obligation-an institution designed mainly for economic security and procreation,"
surveys today indicate that "marriage is understood mainly
as a path toward self-fulfillment."73
Childbearing has declined as well and, as a result,
"families" increasingly contain no children. The average
American woman in the late 1950s had 3.7 children; by 1990
this had dropped to 1.9. 7' Women increasingly postpone
having children: it is estimated that 15-20% of young women
today will never give birth.75 Parenthood has declined in
status over the past few decades according to several measures."6 Moreover, children currently constitute the smallest
proportion of the population ever. The figure dropped from
one-third in 1960 to one-quarter in 1993. 77 For the first time
ever, the average couple now has more parents than it does
children.8
In light of these figures, it is sometimes argued that nuclear families have simply become obsolete, replaced by new
voluntary social arrangements that perform the same functions. 79 But this does not seem to be so. Rather, there has
72. See id. at 533.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 530.
75. See id.
76. The decline in the status of parenthood has been summarized in the
following way:
Between 1957 and 1976, the percentage of adults who felt positive
about parenthood-that is, who viewed parenthood as a role that could
fulfill their major values-dropped from 58 to 44 ....
And between
1970 and 1983, the percentage of women who gave the answer "being a
mother, raising a family" to the question, "What do you think are the
two or three most enjoyable things about being a woman today?"
dropped from 53 to 26. These attitudinal changes are associated with
a remarkable decrease in the stigma associated with childlessness. In
less than 2 decades, from 1962 to 1980, the proportion of American
mothers who stated that "all couples should have children" declined by
nearly half, from 84% to 43%.
Popenoe, supra note 39, at 530 (citations omitted).
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., ARLENE SKOLNICK, EMBATTLED PARADISE: THE AMERICAN
FAMILY IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 154 (1991).
79. See, e.g., JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING
FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 7 (1996) ("No longer is there a single

culturally dominant family pattern ....
Instead, postindustrial conditions
have compelled and encouraged us to craft a wide array of family arrange-
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been a recent rise in the frequency of individuals living alone.
Non-family households (defined as a household maintained
by a person who lives alone or with others to whom he or she
is unrelated) rose from 15% of all households in 1960 to 29%
in 1990. 8 0 85% of these households consist of just one person.8 The proportion of all American adults who are curto 48% in 1994.82
rently unmarried climbed from 28% in 1974
There are also six times as many couples cohabiting today as
in 1960, and pre-marital cohabitation is associated with divorce." From 1960 to 1980, "[t]he proportion of adult lives
spent as a spouse, a parent or a member of a conjugal family
84
unit [dropped to] the lowest point in history," and surveys
show a growing acceptability of divorce, permanent singleness and childlessness. 5
Parents today also spend less time with their children.
In 1985, 14% of pre-school children were cared for in an organized child care facility." The figure has now more than
doubled.8 7 The proportion of working mothers using a child
care facility as the primary form of care for children under
age five rose from 13% in 1977 to 25% in 1985.88 By 1990,
half of all children of working parents were either being
89 A majority of
cared for in a center or in another home.
°
mothers of preschool children now work outside the home.
Mothers today work almost as frequently as non-mothers."
From 1960 to 1990 the proportion of married, working
women with children under six years climbed from 19% to
59%.92 Moreover, 79% of the American population currently
ments. .. ").
80. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 533. See also Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning
Out, supra note 20, at 12 (reporting that the incidence of one-person households

has more than doubled since 1950).
81. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 533. See also Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning
Out, supra note 20, at 12 (reporting that the incidence of one-person households
has more than doubled since 1950).

82. See Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra note 20, at 12.
83. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 534.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See Hamburg, supra note 55, at 5.

87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 4.

91. See Popenoe, supra note 39, at 531.
92. See id.
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believes that two-paychecks are necessary to support a family.93 Parents today devote about 40% less time to direct
child-rearing activities than did their own parents.4 Parents
in 1965 spent about thirty-three hours a week in contact with
their children; by the mid-1980s this figure had declined to
just seventeen hours.9" As a result, a larger fraction of parenting time today is spent doing errands and chores.96
Grandparenting has also declined: only about 5% of all
American children see a grandparent regularly,97 but there
has been a 44% rise in the incidence of grandchildren living
with grandparents since 1980."8 In short, today "children
spend a huge chunk of time during their years of most rapid
growth and development in out-of-home settings or looking
after themselves .... Adolescents increasingly drift into a
separate 'teen culture' that is often lacking in adult leadership, mentorship and support."99
These changes over the past few decades represent a loss
of family social capital because of decreases in the number of
family ties and reduced interactions among family members.' 0 A result of this loss is that the social capital effects of
legal regulation of the family are today more pronounced.'0 '
93. See id.
94. See William A. Galston, Causes of Declining Well-Being Among U.S.
Children, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY 290, 296 (David M. Estlund &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Hamburg, supra note 55, at 6.
98. See Margaret Platt Jendrek, Grandparents Who Parent Their Grandchildren: Effects on Lifestyle, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 609 (1993). An indication
of the social capital effects of these arrangements is that grandparents taking
care of their grandchildren disengage from various other activities and report
diminished social networks. See id. at 614-19. See also ARTHUR KORNHABER,
CONTEMPORARY GRANDPARENTING 130-31 (1996) (reporting that in 1970, 2.2
million children under the age of 18 lived in grandparent-headed households; by
1994 some estimates put the figure as high as seven million).
99. Hamburg, supra note 55, at 6.
100. One response to the evidence of declining social capital has been that
old institutions have simply been replaced by new ones, and, as such, social
capital has not been lost but only changed form. I do not plan to discuss this
point in any detail, except to note that even if other social ties (e.g., friendships)
have indeed replaced family relationships, they do not seem to provide the
same social capital benefits. See, e.g., Walker et al., supra note 33, at 55
(reporting that parent-child ties are so broadly supportive that even weaker,
but still active parent-child ties are able to provide almost as much support as
intimate friendship ties).
101. The effect is a function of scarcity. If the level of social capital is high,
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As such, the need to orient law to serve our collective interests by building social capital in its regulation of family ties
is now all the more urgent. As we move forward to examine
law's effectiveness in its regulation of families, the basic consideration in this article can now be precisely stated: law acts
in our common interests when it protects and promotes social
capital.
III. PROMOTING SOCIAL CAPITAL THROUGH LEGAL
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM COLLABORATIVE REPRODUCTION

A. Model of Shared Parenting
The central idea of shared parenting is that all of the
adults who participate in collaborative reproduction play a
parenting role in the child's life. 10 2 According to this model,
being part of a process that gives birth to a child is a unique
experience that can serve as a basis for a sustained social
connection. Therefore, law should recognize the importance
of gamete donors and surrogates in collaborative reproduction, and encourage long-term social ties between them and
the children they help produce. In the context of singleparent or divorced families, for example, gamete donors or
surrogates might buffer the effects of absent parents, providing practical help as well as emotional support to a child.
In more intact nuclear families, donors and surrogates could
teach children important skills, offer new perspectives or
provide care when parents must work. Put simply, at the
heart of the model of shared parenting is a notion that the
more adults performing parental functions the better.
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of this model
so as to be able to evaluate it from a social capital perspective. We examine two specific proposals of the model. The
first proposal is for openness in collaborative reproduction:
acknowledgment of the use of reproductive collaborators and
their identities. The second proposal is for law to recognize a
parental or associational right between gamete donors or
surrogates and the resulting child."°3
then when law builds social capital, the overall change is fairly small. But if
social capital is low and law creates (or destroys) social capital, the effect is
more dramatic.
102. See supra note 15.

103. The first proposal is a precondition of the second: in order for law to
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1. Openness
The shared parenting model's proposal for greater openness in collaborative reproduction has two components. The
first is for an end to secrecy in order to promote openness
about the fact that collaborative reproduction has been used.
The second is for an end to anonymity in order to identify the
parties involved.
i. Secrecy
Secrecy is common in collaborative reproduction, especially in the case of artificial insemination using sperm provided by a donor.'0 4 Where a couple uses donor sperm, there
is typically secrecy about the identity of the donor, secrecy
from the couple's friends and relatives about the use of the
donor and secrecy from the child about his or her origins.'
The secrecy of artificial insemination parallels the secrecy of
adoption earlier this century. 6
recognize multiple parental relationships, the fact of collaborative reproduction
must be disclosed and the identities of all the participants known.
104. See JUDITH N. LASKER & SUSAN BORG, IN SEARCH OF PARENTHOOD 43
(1987). In one study of 57 couples, 33 told nobody outside the medical profession of their use of artificial insemination by donor. R. SNOWDEN ET AL.,
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 94 (1983). Single women

and lesbian couples are less secretive about the use of donor sperm and there is
also some evidence that couples today increasingly favor record-keeping that
would allow for future contact between their children and the donor. See Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information, Communication
and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 1, 27-28 (1991-92). There has been greater openness in egg donation as well as more common use of eggs from friends or relatives. See Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the
Legacy of the Past,57 ALB. L. REV. 733, 773 (1994).
105. See LASKER & BORG, supra note 104, at 43. Secrecy in collaborative reproduction is not practiced in every country. For example, certain European
countries (notably Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland) prohibit anonymity in
sperm donation; in Germany and Switzerland the right to know one's genetic
origins is constitutionally protected. See Rainer Frank, Germany: Blood Versus
'Mere' Social Ties, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 335 (1993-94); Olivier Guillod,
Switzerland: Everyone Has the Right to Know His or Her Origins!, 32 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 465 (1993-94); Todd Krim, Beyond Baby M: International
Perspectiveson GestationalSurrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological
Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193 (1996).

106. During the first 200 years of adoption in the United States secrecy was
unthinkable. See Katz, supra note 104, at 760-61. But by the second half of the
twentieth century, with a rise in the proportion of children available for adoption who were born out of wedlock, and stigma associated with illegitimacy, secrecy became much more prevalent. See id. By the early 1950s, most states
had mandated anonymity of birth parents in adoption and prohibited contact
between birth parents and adoptive parents. See id. at 761. All legal ties be-
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Secrecy in the use of donor sperm is undoubtedly linked
to the medicalization of artificial insemination. In reality, insemination is a fairly simple procedure that can be performed
at home with a syringe. °7 Physician involvement facilitates
secrecy, removing the need for the couple to find their own
sperm donor. Further, there is evidence that secrecy is
greatly preferred by the medical profession, which is often a
source of sperm.'
Secrecy in the use of donor sperm has been carried to
great lengths. At the collection stage, "[1]eaving receptacles
containing the semen on shelves, against doors and even behind geranium pots, to be picked up by the next person involved in the delivery system, is not unknown." 9 At the insemination stage, some women have been inseminated with a
mixture of semen from both the husband and the donor,
while other couples have been advised to have intercourse on
the day that insemination occurs, to allow some measure of
doubt about actual fatherhood."' At the time of birth, "[m]ost
physicians and other staff members of AID [Artificial Insemination by Donor] programs strongly encourage their patients to keep AID a secret from everyone. They even suggest
tween the adopted child and the birth parents are severed in adoption; the issuance of a second birth certificate symbolizes "a second birth to the adopted
parents, declaring the psychological and social nonexistence of any previous
relationship to the adoptees' biological parents." Id. at 763 (citation omitted).
These steps have allowed birth mothers to pretend they never had a child and
have been thought to facilitate the relationship between the adoptive parents
and the child. See id. Today, however, in general there is much greater openness about adoption. See Gibson, supra note 104, at 5.
107. Indeed, "to speak of artificial insemination as a 'medical treatment' is
an extraordinary usage of that term, given that artificial insemination does not
involve the body of the person with the medical problem." Katz, supra note
104, at 765. Because artificial insemination has been treated as a medical procedure, some jurisdictions have even criminalized it unless performed by a physician; other jurisdictions condition protection from paternity claims on physician involvement. See id. at 766. Egg donation, on the other hand, involves a
procedure that requires medical skill. See id. at 772-73.
108. See id. at 767 (suggesting that because of this medicalization of artificial
insemination, physicians have exercised enormous control over its use, particularly with respect to secrecy practices such as concealing the identity of the
donor, failing to keep identifying information, listing the husband as the father,
and destroying records).
109. See R. SNOWDEN & G. D. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY: A
CONSIDERATION OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR 69 (1981).

110. Id. at 94-95. Many physicians, however, recommend against these practices because the success rate seems to be higher where there is no mixing of
sperm. See LASKER & BORG, supra note 104, at 42.
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not telling the obstetrician who delivers the baby, so that the
husband's name will be put on the birth certificate without
hesitation.""'. Finally, secrecy may pervade a child's entire
life: parents often worry for years that the child will grow up
not to resemble the husband."2
Secrecy in the use of donor sperm seems principally focused on protecting the husband from the embarrassment of
infertility."' As such, couples using donor sperm have been
known to explain medical appointments to relatives and
friends as efforts to treat the wife's fertility problem, with the
implication that male infertility would be much more embarrassing."' Because of the apparent stigma of male infertility," 5 a couple's reliance on donor sperm can lead to marital
difficulties as the husband feels jealous of the donor"' and
outright denial that donor sperm was even used."7
The model of shared parenting makes two arguments for
increased disclosure in collaborative reproduction. First, secrecy surrounding collaborative reproduction impedes the
formation of familial ties between reproductive collaborators
and the resulting children. Where the occurrence of collaborative reproduction remains unacknowledged, law is unable
to encourage participants to form social relationships with
the children they help produce. As such, secrecy undermines
the entire program of the model of shared parenting."8
Second, secrecy may threaten relationships within the
child's social family. Secrecy can lead to family tensions if
the husband's embarrassment with his own infertility is unresolved and he comes to feel isolated from the family, or
111. LASKER & BORG, supra note 104, at 45.
112. See SNOWDEN ETAL., supra note 104, at 137.
113. See MICHAEL & HEATHER HUMPHREY, FAMILIES WITH A DIFFERENCE:
VARIETIES OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 134-37 (1988); SNOWDEN ET AL., supra

note 104, at 130.
114. See SNOWDEN ETAL., supra note 104, at 104-05.

115. Having biological children is still widely considered a condition of full
adult male status. See id. at 128.

116. See Humphrey, supra note 113, at 134-37.
117. See id. at 136. See also SNOWDEN ET AL., supra note 104, at 149. This

study concluded that "[t]o acknowledge ... that the child was the genetic procreation of another man was for most men a hurtful and traumatic experience.

Some men found it so potentially hurtful that they evaded this acknowledgment
by a defensive, psychological denial that the donor was in fact the genitor of the
child." Id.
118. In this way, secrecy parallels anonymity, an issue which we take up
next.
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even to reject the child." 9 Furthermore, secrecy is psycho12
logically taxing and often produces considerable stress. 1
One commentator concludes that "the social and psychological problems created by keeping the secret from the child
(and by implication, other members of the family) may be
greater than those that result from telling the child."' 21 Chil-

dren who grow up in families where basic truths are kept
hidden may come to sense that something is amiss and experience uncertainty. 2 2 And relationships with other relatives
119. See Gibson, supra note 104, at 11 (citing Clamar, PsychologicalImplications of Donor Insemination,40 AM. J. OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 173 (1980); Gerstel,
A Psychoanalytic View of Artificial Donor Insemination, 17 AM. J. OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 64 (1963); Berger et. al., Psychological Patternsin Donor Insemination Couples, 31 CAN. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 818, 819 (1986); Kraft et. al., The
Psychological Dimensions of Infertility, 50 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 618,
622 (1980)). See also ANNETTE BARAN & REUBEN PANNOR, LETHAL SECRETS:
THE SHOCKING CONSEQUENCES

AND UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF ARTIFICIAL

INSEMINATION 51 (1989) (arguing that artificial insemination by donor results
in the erosion of family relationships).
120. As the philosopher Sissela Bok writes:
Secrecy can harm those who make use of it in several ways. It can debilitate judgment, first of all, whenever it shuts out criticism and feedback, leading people to become mired down in stereotyped, unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and ways of thinking. Neither their
perception of a problem nor their reasoning about it then receives the
benefit of challenge and exposure. Scientists working under conditions
of intense secrecy have testified to its stifling effect on their judgment
and creativity. And those who have written about their undercover
work as journalists, police agents, and spies, or about living incognito
for political reasons, have described similar effects of prolonged concealment on their capacity to plan and to choose, at times on their
sense of identity.
Secrecy can affect character and moral choice in similar ways. It
allows people to maintain fagades that conceal traits such as callousness or vindictiveness-traits which can, in the absence of criticism or
challenge from without, prove debilitating. And guilty or deeply embarrassing secrets can corrode from within before outsiders have a
chance to respond or to be of help ....
As secrecy debilitates character and judgment, it can also lower resistance to the irrational and pathological.
SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 25

(1982).
121. SNOWDEN & MITCHELL, supra note 109, at 69 (emphasis added).
122. One study reports:
Communication is not only dependent on the spoken word; sometimes
there exists an unspoken awareness that a particular topic should be
avoided. Even young children can sense this without there ever being
direct mention of it. This is particularly so in the family, which is an
organization where each person has the opportunity to get to know the
feelings and thoughts of other members who are regularly in close
proximity .... There are two points here that are relevant to the AID
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may be undermined if based on a lie. 2 '
Since it may be difficult to maintain the secret of collaborative reproduction, there exists a constant risk of an upsetting disclosure. Although couples may resolve not to tell
their child about her origins, they nonetheless find it difficult
not to tell anybody at all. 24 As such, the child might discover
the truth from somebody else and may assume that there is
something wrong with being conceived by collaborative reproduction and, therefore, something wrong with him or
her.'25 Alternatively, the secret may be revealed as an act of
hostility by one of the parents, for example, the mother
wishing to hurt the husband, or the father disowning the
child in a fit of anger.'26 Or the truth may come out in other
unfavorable circumstances, such as a divorce and custody
[Artificial Insemination by Donor] family: first, the secret may not be
as secure as the family would like to believe and, secondly, security
may become more difficult as the child grows up and becomes more
discerning .... Children, too, are sometimes aware that there is a
deep family secret without knowing the precise nature of the secret.
Sometimes the fantasy surrounding the secret takes very strange
forms such as those reported [by one researcher] that some
[AID]... children believed they were the result of virgin births.
Id. at 85. See also Neil Leighton, The Family: Whose construct is it anyway?, in
THE FAMILY IN THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 91, 100 (Carole Ulanowsky ed.
1995) ("If the truth is not shared, it is hard to imagine that the relationships
will be unaffected.").
123. One work notes:
[T]he basis of these family relationships is being artificially supported
by the maintenance of this secret over a long period of time, indeed, often for life. Relatives, therefore, who are not party to the secret and
who assume normal blood ties with the child have expectations with
respect to rights and obligations towards the child, which are based on
a false premise: a false premise which is known to be false to some
members of the kin network (the child's mother and her husband), but
not others .... If the secret is kept it is reasonable to suppose that
keeping it for a long time from one's kin may produce stress for an artificial insemination by donor (AID) couple.
SNOWDEN & MITCHELL, supra note 109, at 102.
124. One study concludes:
No matter how strongly they express a commitment to secrecy, most of
the people in our study and in others had told at least one or two others. They are selective, often telling one set of parents but not the
other, or certain friends they assumed would be sympathetic. But they
have found it very difficult not to tell anyone at all.
LASKER & BORG, supra note 104, at 44. See also Gibson, supra note 104, at 14.
125. See SNOWDEN & MITCHELL, supra note 109, at 105 (citing J. Holland,
Adoption and Artificial Insemination:Some Implications, 50 SOUNDINGS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL, 302-07 (1971)).

126. See LASKER & BORG, supra note 104, at 160.
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battle.2 7
In each of these ways, secrecy can undermine family relationships.'28 There is also evidence that children may experience psychological difficulties when unaware of or cut off
from their genetic origins; on this theory, secrecy could be a
constant source of instability. 29 In short, secrecy in collaborative reproduction undermines the familial ties that this
model seeks to sustain-those between the reproductive collaborators, the social parents, and the child.
ii. Anonymity
Just as collaborative reproduction is largely cloaked in
secrecy, the majority of donors of sperm, eggs or embryos remain anonymous to the couples they help and to the children
produced. 3 ° Anonymity prevents participants in collaborative reproduction from forming a relationship with a child,
because there can be no social tie where identity is unknown.
The model of shared parenting, therefore, proposes that law
discourage anonymity. It suggests' that gamete donors
should be able to discover the identity of the children they
help produce and that children know their genetic parents.
Similarly, surrogate mothers should know where the children
they give birth to end up, and all children should know their
gestational mothers.
The model suggests several ways for law to promote
identification of participants in collaborative reproduction.
First, health professionals who assist in collaborative repro127. See id. at 160; Gibson, supra note 104, at 11. The manner of disclosure
can be critical for psychological well-being: evidence from the adoption context
indicates that the way in which adopted children learn of their status is more
important than when they find out. See HUMPHREY, supra note 113, at 89.
128. In one study, all of the couples who had told family or friends found that
it had been advantageous to do so; in almost every case the decision to use donor sperm was accepted without any reservation. SNOWDEN ET AL., supra note
104, at 112.
129. See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text. Knowledge of one's genetic history may also have medical benefits. See Gibson, supra note 104, at 2223. And some commentators suggest that secrecy risks future incest (although
such a risk is surely small). See id. at 23-24.
130. See Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 623, 659 (1991). Robertson reports that anonymity has been the
usual practice with sperm donation and may also inform egg and embryo donation, and even surrogacy, though often surrogates and egg donors meet the
couples they help. ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 123. Further, family members may serve as surrogates or egg donors. See id.
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duction could be required to keep records and provide identifying information to all of the parties involved. Alternatively,
the identity of each party could be recorded on the child's
birth certificate, and a copy provided to each participant.
Children born from collaborative reproduction could have a
protected right of access to their own birth records, including
the identity of collaborators. Or there could be a system of
registration such that children and collaborators may all access identifying information from a central source.
Before leaving this proposal, we consider two sets of objections to ending anonymity and the model's responses to
them. First, gamete donors may object, concerned that if
their identities are revealed they may at some future point be
held financially responsible for the children they helped create. 3 ' The model of shared parenting answers this concern
by proposing statutes specifying the obligations of donors." 2
A further concern on the collaborator side is that without
anonymity sperm banks and other institutions would be unable to attract donors. The model's response to this claim is
that it seems unsupported by empirical evidence: many donors appear comfortable with having their identities revealed.'

A second set of objections to ending anonymity comes
from social parents. There is evidence that they also prefer
that donors remain anonymous so as not to be able to later
disrupt the family's life (or perhaps try to take away the
child). Indeed, some social parents even discourage children
from contacting a genetic parent whose identity is known.'
131. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 130, at 659-60; Kristin E. Koehler,
Artificial Insemination: in the Child's Best Interest?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
321, 332-33 (1996).
132. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 130, at 660 n.182 (suggesting that
the fear of liability is reduced in the thirty-one states that have adopted statutes providing that the husband of the sperm recipient is the legal father).
133. At the Sperm Bank of Northern California, for example, 75% of donors
agreed to provide a name and address allowing future contact. Id. at 661.
Other studies have demonstrated that donors have an interest in the results of
their participation, if not in having their identities revealed. In one such study,
79% of donors desired to know the outcome of inseminations with their semen.
(And secrecy was not especially important: a majority had already told others of
their donation.) But only a minority wished to know anything about the child
or the social parents, and most favored anonymity. Gibson, supra note 104, at
29 (citing Sauer et. al., Attitudinal Survey of Sperm Donors to an Artificial Insemination Clinic, 34 J. OF REPRODUCTWVE MED. 362, 363 (1989)).
134. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 130, at 659.
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The model considers this fear of disruption an exaggerated
and insufficient reason to maintain anonymity. Because
children are capable of maintaining social ties with multiple
adults," 5 strong relationships with others (even genetic others) need not dilute a child's bond with his or her social family.
Knowing the identity of a gamete donor or surrogate is
unlikely by itself to represent a custody threat, since participants in collaborative reproduction rarely renege on deals
and seek custody.13 Even surrogate mothers, who are arguably the most likely to pose a custody threat, usually do not
regret having to turn over a baby to social parents.'37 In addition, evidence from the surrogacy context suggests that the
greater the openness and contact between the various participants in collaborative reproduction, the more smoothly
the process actually proceeds. For example, in a study of
forty-one surrogates, 22% of the women felt that giving up
the baby was the most emotionally difficult aspect of the experience. But for 25% of the surrogates, the most difficult
138
aspect was losing contact with the contracting parents.
The same study found that 75% of the women considered the
most rewarding part of their experience the "creation of a
family, giving the gift of life, seeing the beautiful baby, or

135. This has been the experience with divorce and subsequent remarriage:
The reality is that, in many potential stepparent adoption situations,
the child has three or more parents. Often the child will form a strong
bond with the spouse of the custodial parent without sacrificing the
bond with the visiting non-custodial parent. In addition, the child may
bond strongly to the spouse of the non-custodial parent, if visitation is
frequent and extended, thus recognizing psychologically, if not legally,
four persons serving in the role of parent. As is often the case, the law
fails to reflect the reality of the way in which individuals relate to one
another.
James B. Boskey, The Swamps of Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-Child
Relationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 826 (1995).
136. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND

HUMAN ISSUES 5 n.16 (1st Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 1988) (reporting
that of 500 surrogacy contracts between 1976 and 1986, 495 were fulfilled without incident); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 424 (1st Harvard Univ.
Press paperback ed. 1992).
137. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 130, at 677-78.
138. See id. at 676-77 (citing Kathy Forest & David MacPhee, Surrogate
Mothers' Grief Experiences and Social Support Networks 17 (1989)
(unpublished manuscript, available at Department of Human Development and
Family Studies, Colorado State University.)).
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seeing the couple's happiness."139
Finally, the model of shared parenting suggests that
anonymity has probably been preferred because the benefits
of openness have not been experienced. Again, the evidence
from surrogacy is instructive. In a study of eighty-nine surrogates and adoptive couples, all couples agreed that
"knowing each other" benefited the children; in some cases
the families grew close. "' Had surrogacy been anonymous
from its outset (with centers established for women to secretly gestate and give birth and then anonymously ship
children to paying parents) then perhaps the same reasons in
support of anonymity in the donation of gametes would be
expressed in support of anonymity of surrogacy. Conversely,
if openness is broadened and contact with gamete donors
does not prove to threaten custody or undermine the bonds
between children and their social parents, then openness
may well be viewed more positively. In short, the model argues that the current preference for anonymity reflects a lack
of experience.' 4
2. Parentalor AssociationalRight
The second proposal under the model of shared parenting
is for law to recognize a parental or associational right between gamete donors or gestational surrogates and the children they help produce. Such a right is intended to encourage the formation of a social relationship between
reproductive collaborators and children. Although the mere
formalization of a biological link may never be sufficient to
ensure a successful social relationship, the model suggests
that legal recognition of such a tie would make the development of social relationships more likely.'
The model has two
139. Id.
140. Id. at 678.
141. As will be seen, this model further suggests that the experience with
open adoption indicates that the resistance to contact with donors of genetic
material (or with surrogates) reflects an exaggerated fear. See infra notes 171173 and accompanying text.
142. For many people there is a special significance to having biological offspring. This explains why infertility is often considered a shortcoming and why
most parents take note of features of their children that resemble their own.
The significance of biological ties also accounts for attitudes towards adoption.
Although adoption can bring all of the joys of parenthood, it tends to be seen as
a second choice to biological reproduction. Further, in adoption children's attributes are often matched to those of adoptive parents, there is a preference
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different versions of the right that law should assign to reproductive collaborators." The first version involves a modest right of association. The second version provides for
much more extensive parental rights.
i. Limited AssociationalRights
In its more modest version, the model of shared parenting proposes that law recognize a right of association between
reproductive collaborators and their resulting children. This
may be considered a quasi-parental or a non-parental right,
but in no case would it be akin to the rights of the social parents. Accordingly, the right would be one of contact or visitation. An associational right would not threaten the legal
status of the social parents nor would it confer deep financial
or other obligations on the donor or surrogate. It might provide merely for an annual visit with the child in the presence
of the social parents for a fixed number of years, and then
jeave the parties free to continue or terminate contact as they
prefer. Or the right could involve more regular visits with or
without the social parents present. In either case, the right
of association could be revocable should it turn out to be
against the best interests of the child.
According to the model, a right of association represents
a small but critical change in the relationships of collaborative reproduction. Left to their own devices, individuals involved in collaborative reproduction might be reluctant to initiate contact with each other but, once started, such contact
could produce substantial benefits. Once in touch with the
child the model suggests that donors or surrogates could become a reliable source of emotional and practical support
for heterosexual couples (mirroring biological reproduction), and the fact of
adoption itself may be concealed. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 130, at
627-29. Some people, of course, want nothing to do with their genetic kin. And
some adopted children may go through life without much of an urge to ever
track down the source of their own genes. But for many people, genetic ties
remain important, if only because our society places such an emphasis on them.
See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 209
(1995). As such, there is at least some reason to think that genetic ties may
serve as the basis of a social link between donors of gametes or gestational surrogates and the children of collaborative reproduction.
143. These represent end points on a spectrum of possible formulations or
versions of the right, rather than the only available choices. Law could quite
easily combine elements of each version, or apply one version in some instances

of collaborative reproduction and the other version in different instances.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

similar to other family members. Therefore law should provide the parties with an initial push (or perhaps just an excuse for interaction) to encourage the formation of social relationships that might become significant over the long-term.
This associational right in collaborative reproduction
mimics statutory rights of visitation and contact between
children and third-parties in other contexts. In particular,
all fifty states have statutes giving grandparents visitation
rights.'
The nature of these grandparent rights varies
among states. Some states simply allow for reasonable visitation with no prerequisites, 4 ' while other states permit visitation only if there has been a death of a child's parent, a divorce between the parents or a step-parent adoption.'4 6
Certain states extend visitation rights beyond the context of
grandparents to stepparents, siblings and other relatives as
well and even to non relatives who have an interest in the
welfare of a child.'47 This version of the model thus draws on
the pre-existing associational rights of family members and
other third parties and extends these rights to reproductive
collaborators and the children they produce. Just as associational rights granted in these contexts preserve and build
family ties, the model uses such rights to encourage familial
relationships in collaborative reproduction while preserving
the role of the social parents.
ii. Expansive ParentalRights
In its more expansive version, the model of shared parenting assigns to reproductive collaborators parental rights
that co-exist with the rights of a child's social parents. Professor Kandel, a scholar of anthropology and law, makes the
strongest case for this version of the model and so we rely on
her presentation of the argument.'4 8 Kandel's discussion fo144. See generally Richard S. Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-Party
Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q. 19 (1991).
145. See id. at 22-25.
146. See id.
147. See id. For a discussion of constitutional limits on granting visitation
rights to grandparents and other third parties, see Beth Neu, Note, 37 S. TEX.
L. REV. 911, 939-46 (1996); Samuel V. Schoonmaker et al., ConstitutionalIssues
Raised by Third-Party Access to Children, 25 FAM. L.Q. 95 (1991); Samuel V.
Schoonmaker et al., Third-PartyAccess to Children: Update on Constitutional
Issues, 25 FAM. L.Q. 117 (1991).
148. Randy Frances Kandel, Which Came First: The Mother or the Egg? A
Kinship Solution to Gestational Surrogacy, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 165 (1994).
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cuses on assigning parental rights in the context of gestational surrogacy, but drawing on her work to exemplify the
proposal does not preclude recognizing such rights in other
contexts. " '
Professor Kandel is motivated by a California court's assertion that a child may have only one natural mother in gestational surrogacy, the genetic mother. 5 ' Kandel argues that
the court's reasoning reflects a myopic resistance to expanding notions of motherhood-particularly to recognizing more
In Kandel's
than one woman as a child's natural mother.'
view, the claims of a genetic and of a gestational mother to be
"The gea child's natural parent are equally compelling.'
Kandel
material,"
netic parents' contribution of hereditary
argues, "determines most of the physical, mental, and tem153
peramental qualities which the child will possess at birth."
In addition, in surrogacy "[t]he genetic mother suffers the
risky surgical removal of her eggs, often preceded by harrowing years of infertility treatments and clinicalized sexual
relations which have been carefully timed to coincide with

149. See also Boskey, supra note 135. Boskey argues that "law should be
prepared to recognize the existence of a parent-child relationship between any
number of adults and a child in appropriate circumstances." Id. at 809. He
suggests that parental rights-consisting of the right of possession, the right of
association, the right of supervision, and the right of acquisition-as well as parental duties-to provide, protect, and nurture-can be rebundled in various
ways in order to give multiple adults parental or quasi-parental status. Id. at
813-23. Boskey focuses on social connections as giving rise to parenthood; in
his view, then, merely being a sperm or egg donor would be insufficient to confer parental status (even where multiple adults can share the re-bundled rights
and duties). Id. at 844. Boskey is undecided, however, about whether gestational surrogates should be recognized as parents because he is uncertain about
the "weight that one assigns to the physical nurturing of the child during pregnancy." Id. at 845. Still, Boskey's approach fits with this version of the model
because he does not see parenthood as entailing choices between one individual
and another (or between one couple and another) but rather as a matter of
weighing the claims of any number of individuals, all of whom could potentially
be recognized as parents. Id.
150. Kandel, supra note 148, at 173-78 (citing Anna J. v. Mark C, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991), affd sub nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993)).
151. Id. at 180-82. Kandel notes that even where definitions of motherhood
have been relaxed (such as in homosexual adoption), one woman is still recognized as the natural mother, with maternal status extended by analogy to a
second woman performing parenting tasks. Id.
152. Id. at 187-88.
153. Id. at 188.
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her ovulatory cycle." " On the other hand the gestational
mother, according to Kandel, is "elaborately linked through
155
biochemical and hormonal interconnections" to the fetus.
She provides nourishment and protects the fetus, which uses
the mother's excretory and respiratory systems.'56 In addition, the gestational mother faces all the health risks of
pregnancy.'5 7 Given that these claims to motherhood are both
strong, Kandel suggests that rather than insist a child has
only one natural mother, law should accept that "[dlual
motherhood is a fact of nature because it is made possible by
technology."'58
Kandel draws on a large body of anthropological evidence
to show that arrangements involving multiple parents benefit
children as well as the communities in which such practices
occur. Kandel describes a system of multiple care-taking
among the Efe of Northeastern Zaire. There, nursing and
child-care responsibilities are shared from the moment a
child is born with successful results:
At three weeks, infants spend thirty-nine percent of their
time in physical contact with people other than their
mothers and at eighteen weeks, sixty percent of their time
is spent with people other than their mothers. Researchers found that Efe infants were likely to be precocious in
their social skills and predisposed to cooperation, mutual
support, and gregariousness."'
Kandel also describes child sharing in Oceania, among
Native Americans, and in West Africa. 6 ° She reports, for example, that in Oceanic societies "'feeding children,' the practice of sharing and exchanging children among relatives and
close friends, is pervasive. ""'
Kandel indicates that a
"feeding child" in Oceania may have equal contact with two
sets of family groups and be equally at home in each household.'62 The "feeding parents" devise property to the child at
154. Id. (citations omitted).
155. Kandel, supra note 148, at 188 (citations omitted).
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 193.
159. Id. at 195 (citing Edward Z. Tronick et al., Multiple Caretaking of Efe
(Pygmy) Infants, 89 AM. ANTHROPOL. 96, 96-104 (1987)).
160. Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
161. Kandel, supra note 148, at 204 (citations omitted).
162. Id. (citations omitted).

1998]

SOCIAL CAPITAL

31

the time of "adoption" and the child inherits from both biological and "feeding parents."'63 Both sets of Oceanic parents
Kandel reports that
provide for and discipline the child.'
given time more
any
at
that
show
Oceania
from
survey data
of their biohome
than 25% of all children do not live in the
logical parents.
Kandel emphasizes the benefits of such arrangements for
children: "[fMrom the perspective of all the children, the advantage of child sharing lies in having a broadened network
of social support and an enlarged set of role models to aid in
bridging the gap between the nuclear family and the larger
society."'66 She asserts that "children can flourish in contexts
where social rearing is shared,"'67 and that children raised
under co-parenting arrangements in West Africa are less aggressive, less anxious and more independent than those
raised only by their birth parents.'68 She notes that kibbutz
children-also raised by multiple mothers-are emotionally
healthy and possess strong interpersonal skills. 9 Finally,
Kandel reports that there are important benefits to communities in which shared-parenting occurs since such arrangements efficiently distribute children among members of a so° and link individuals into strong kinship
group"
cial
future cooperative action. 7 '
that facilitate
networks

163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
165. Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 210 (citations omitted).

167. Kandel, supra note 148, at 200.
168. Id. at 210 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 195 (citing MELFORD E. SPIRO, CHILDREN OF THE KIBBUTZ 196209 (1958)).

170. Id. at 201 (citations omitted). Kandel suggests that shared-parenting
"allocates rights and responsibilities for... children, in a way which is adaptive
and functional for a particular society." Id. (citations omitted). She continues:
"[t]he flexible nature of child exchange... makes it an effective means for reallocating people in response to need and compensating for the unequal statistical distribution of births.., thus maintaining a total number of individuals
and a sex ratio more suitable to familial and economic needs." Id. at 205
(citations omitted).
171. Kandel, supra note 148, at 206-08. Kandel emphasizes the social importance of child-sharing:
Oceanic child exchange operates in a context of kinship solidarity and
support. Children are regarded as a resource to be shared among
those who recognize one another as kin. It is a compliment to ask for a
child and an insult to refuse to give one, especially to a childless relative. To refuse a request for a child is to deny the existence of a kin-
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Kandel finds shared parenting in these other contexts an
"inspiring model for gestational surrogacy families,"'72 and
she is optimistic that child sharing may be imported to inform and reform American surrogacy practices.'73 Kandel
thus advocates that gestational surrogacy agreements be understood as setting forth the terms of custody allocation
rather than designating parentage:
The gestational surrogacy contract should be interpreted
as a contract which creates a kinship group consisting of a
child and three parents, all of whom retain their co-equal
parenting rights. Its purpose is to allocate custodial rights
and responsibilities among the three parents of a common
child .... In essence, the gestational surrogacy agreement is very much like the custody and visitation agreements made between separated, divorced, and never married parents and74 should be governed by the same
principles of law.1

Kandel argues that in gestational surrogacy "the child's
close and continuing contact with [all] parents should be encouraged," as is done in custody arrangements between di-

vorced parents. 175

She offers specific proposals for dividing

parental rights and responsibilities among these three parship bond with the person making the request .... Furthermore,
feeding a child creates a kinship bond which endures over generations .... [F]riends who exchange children then become kin .... Exchanging and sharing children is a transaction in co-parenting, a generalized and flexible contract pursuant to which people become and
remain close kin.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 211.
173. Kandel suggests that child-sharing is not entirely foreign to the United
States. Id. She cites the contemporary prevalence of children with multiple
sets of "parents" because their natural parents have divorced and remarried.
She notes also that parenting functions are often performed by other relatives,
friends, or neighbors in African-American communities. Id. And she points to
instances of open adoption. Id. at 211-14. Kandel is especially enthusiastic
about open adoption: "Continuing a relationship with her birth parents permits
an adopted child to know that she is remembered and loved. Furthermore, a
child of open adoption is better able to experience and assimilate the fullness of
her identity." Kandel, supra note 148, at 199 (citing Annette Baran & Reuben
Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, in 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 119,
119-122 (1993); KATHLEEN SILBER & MARTINEZ DORNER, CHILDREN OF OPEN
ADOPTION 51, 68-70 (1989)). Kandel suggests that since open adoption shares
many of the features of her proposal for child-sharing it provides evidence that
child sharing in surrogacy can work successfully in the United States. Id. at
235.
174. Id. at 226.
175. Id. at 227.
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ents. In her view, "the gestational surrogacy agreement
should be premised upon two specific understandings. First,
one mother is bearing the child so that the other mother, and
the genetic father, can fulfill the social roles of parenthood.
Second, the gestational mother will remain actively involved
Thus, Kandel argues that a
in the child's social rearing."'
child should presumptively reside with the genetic parents
who should have the bulk of parenting time, daily child care,
decision-making responsibilities and rewards of raising the
child.'77 But the gestational mother should also act as a "real
life parent to her child" and have substantial parenting time
as well.'7 8 According to Kandel, "the gestational mother
should nurse the baby and visit the genetic parents' home to
feed, bathe and play with the child" from the point of birth. 9
As the child grows older, he or she should visit with the gestational mother for longer periods.'8 ° Kandel argues that the
goal in this system of multiple parents should be for the child
to spend one third of parenting time with the gestational
mother, although a different arrangement could be negotiThe gestational mother may also
ated among the parties.'
decide to terminate her parental rights after the birth of the
child, but surrogacy contracts should not be enforceable as
such.'82 In addition, Kandel suggests that a surrogacy contract, understood as an agreement about custody, would be
subject to modification if in the best interests of the child (a
standard which does183not itself compel a choice between two
women as mothers).
Kandel proposes that the legal system should give genetic parents incentives to treat the gestational mother
fairly: "the presumption that the genetic parents have a
greater share of parenting time is premised upon their encouraging and supporting the active involvement of the gestational mother in the child's social rearing, if she so desires. ""' As such, if the genetic parents interfere with contact
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 228.
Kandel, supra note 148, at 229.
Id.
Id. at 229-30.
Id.
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 227.
Kandel, supra note 148, at 226-27.
Id. at 231-32.
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between the gestational mother
and the child, custody modi185
sought.
be
could
fications
3. Evaluation
The model of shared parenting represents law's clearest
acknowledgment of its effects on family social capital. The
model specifically seeks to generate and sustain new social
relationships, a feature that distinguishes it from the other
models we will consider. Rather than choose among participants in collaborative reproduction when determining parenthood, the model recognizes each of the adults involved and
treats their presence as an opportunity to build new familial
bonds. The model also aims to protect relationships within a
child's social family by promoting greater openness. In short,
the model represents an effort by law to generate social capital in building new social ties, as well as to protect social
capital in existing family relationships.
Despite these efforts, the model of shared parenting fails
to offer law a useful program by which to protect and promote social capital for collective benefit. The basic problem
with this model is that it seeks to produce social capital
through highly coercive means. That is, it builds social ties
by forcing interactions among individuals who would otherwise not connect.'8 6 The model is not simply a program for
thinking broadly about family relationships or for permitting
and encouraging a myriad of familial connections. Rather,
the model of shared parenting is one that requires social interactions. It does not merely recognize instances where
shared parenting occurs voluntarily, but instead seeks to
make shared parenting happen. The model aims, in other
185. Id.
186. It is important to make clear at the outset Qf this evaluation who is being coerced under the model of shared parenting. Coercion means not simply
that children are forced to interact with reproductive collaborators (or that collaborators are forced to interact with children where the parental or associational right works that way as well). More significantly, the model coerces
adult to adult relationships. Under this model, the child's social parents are
forced to interact with the reproductive collaborator and to provide access to
their child, when they would otherwise prefer not to do so. This is easily seen
by comparing the model's scheme with that of marriage. Under the model, social parents are resistant to the involvement of the reproductive collaboratorwhose relationship with the child occurs despite this resistance. In marriage,
by contrast, the relationship of each parent with the child takes place with the
consent and encouragement of the other parent. See infra note 192.
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words, to reach parties who would not ordinarily engage in
these types of familial relationships. Indeed, these partiesforced to interact-are the focus of the model's social capital
efforts. Under the model, law builds social capital not
through the power of persuasion and encouragement, but
through law's outright coercion. Social capital is thus said to
be built only because law alters the balance sheet by specifying that new social ties formally exist where none before
were present.
Most seriously, the model of shared parenting subjects
familial relationships to litigation and enforcement by courts.
In order to generate new social capital, the model relies on
tools that law has developed for dealing with relationships
that have broken down and cannot proceed amicably without
intervention and control: division of parenting, detailed specification of rights and responsibilities and recourse to judicial
power to sanction violations or interferences.18 7 The model
essentially turns the arrival of a newborn into a proceeding
not unlike divorce and custody. The very concept of a parental or associational right, as proposed by the model,18 clearly
reveals that the model's focus is the development of social
connections that would not occur voluntarily and that instead
require law's coercion.
It is this involvement of law (potential or actual) at the
most specific level (particular families) using its most specific
tools (assignment and enforcement of rights and responsibilities) to resolve disputes (anticipated or actual) that shows
why the model of shared parenting does not help create,
prospectively and generally, social capital. This model rests
on the identification of particular individual parties and provides them with a specified set of legal claims that are enforceable by courts. Under the model of shared parenting,
law is to build social capital by giving individuals rights they
can enforce. Individuals, turned litigants, do law's work.
Social capital is not built by coercion. The work that is
done to create social capital under this model represents effort without achievement. The stock of social capital that
shared parenting appears to create is illusory, vanishing at
the slightest touch. Social ties that rely on enforceable rights

187. See supra notes 172-185 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part III.A.2.
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of access and association, and judicial sanctions for interference, are an especially weak form of connection. Indeed, one
might say that they are not a form of connection at all, since
granting rights of access represents a poor mechanism to
generate ongoing bonds of trust and loyalty. Where interaction requires the exercise of an assigned right and occurs only
as a response to the right's mandate, the interaction remains
little more than a right exercised by one party and a mandate
obeyed by the other. Indeed, we usually think of relationships that occur in spite of a set of rules and threats to be of a
special, personal nature: lovers who marry against the
wishes of their families, friendships that cross religious or
ethnic borders, relationships that risk punishment because
they defy taboos. But when interactions occur because individuals have no other choice, it is clear that the lack of choice
is the reason they take place, not because there is anything
special or significant about the relationship itself. The very
presence of a rule requiring a social interaction is the signal
that the tie itself is devoid of meaning. If the tie stood for
anything more than what the rule assigns it, then the rule
would not be necessary. Without the buttress of regulation
and coercion, therefore, the social relationships created under
this model collapse.
The spirit of shared parenting seems attractive if law is
to build and sustain social capital for collective benefits. As
Professor Kandel's anthropological evidence indicates, children can benefit from deep relationships with multiple
adults, even multiple mothers. But where reaping these
benefits requires formalism, litigation, judicial monitoring
and enforcement and the tools of divorce, something has obviously been lost in the translation. Where law's role becomes to measure complaints, resolve disputes and order
compliance, it is unlikely to generate social capital.
Social capital requires at least a minimal amount of
choice. It requires that individuals connect because, at some
level they want to, not because they fear punishment if they
disobey. Choice is the prerequisite for social capital not simply because it is through choice that people form meaningful
relationships, but because choice is the condition for law
promoting social ties at all. Choice is the guarantee that social ties exist in fact, not merely in law. That is, choice
makes sure that there is more to relationships than only
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their legal recognition or designation Choice serves as a
check on law's temptation to call "social capital" what is only
a legally-defined relationship and to be lazy in its work of
building actual social ties. A requirement of choice makes
law do more than just formalize relationships which are
themselves meaningless. Choice, in essence, binds law's
hands, preventing it from relying wholly on its most coercive
tools in its task to build social capital precisely because those
tools fail to produce social capital for collective benefits.
Professor Kandel's reliance on open adoption18 to gauge
the success of her version of shared parenting is thus misplaced. Open adoption, if successful, involves ties that are
voluntarily formed, quite the opposite of what the model of
shared parenting proposes. Given that open adoption is
rarely recognized, it does not generally create legally enforceable rights (such agreements are unenforceable in nearly
every state). 90 Indeed, the absence of legal recognition and
enforcement makes it difficult to determine just how successful open adoption agreements even are. Social ties formed
through open adoption exist because all of the parties agree,
and continue to agree, that they should exist. This is quite
different from the shared parenting model's reliance on enforcement of legally assigned rights.
A more relevant comparison for Kandel's version of the
model would be divorce, with shared custody or assignment
of visitation rights. There, the experience casts a darker
shadow on the model's proposal. Such arrangements exist
precisely because relationships have broken down, and formalization steps in to fill the gap left by the departure of mutual trust. Shared custody is hardly an ideal arrangement
for a child, 9 ' and it does not serve social capital well. Its
189. See supra note 171.
190. The exception is the state of Oregon in which written agreements giving
birth parents (as well as grandparents and siblings) continued access to an
adopted child are enforceable. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305 (Supp. 1994).
191. But see CHRISTY M. BUCHANAN, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY, & SANFORD M.
DORNBUSCH, ADOLESCENTS AFTER DIVORCE 254 (1996) (reporting only minor

effects of dual residence on adolescent adjustment following divorce); Charlene
E. Depner, Revolution and Reassessment: Child Custody in Context, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 99, 105-09
(Adele Eskeles Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds., 1994). Depner concludes
that the literature on the effects of joint custody for children is uncertain. Id.
She reports that few studies have considered links between custody status and
psychological well-being of children and that the studies that do exist do not
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purpose is to harmonize interactions where disputes have occurred and future hostilities are likely. It is an attempt to
salvage something from a relationship that has deteriorated,
not a mechanism for creating new and healthy connections.
The more limited version of this model, recognizing only
an associational right, does not resolve the difficulty. Although more modest in its scope, an enforceable right remains the mechanism for creating social connections in this
version of the model as well. Law's role might be less intrusive, and less litigation might arise, but reduced coercion is a
function of this version's more modest goals, not a sign that it
successfully builds social capital. 9 '
find significant custody effects. Id. Further, fathers who have joint custody
spend more time with their children and are more likely to pay child support.
Id. Yet Depner notes that other studies have shown that children find it difficult to handle the logistics that joint custody requires and that they generally
report satisfaction with shared-parenting only when their parents are not engaged in conflict. Id.
192. Two objections to my evaluation of the model of shared parenting are
likely. The first objection is that the actual relationship that the model of
shared parenting seeks to promote is the relationship between the reproductive
collaborator(s) and the child that results. Those parties may not be resistant at
all to such a relationship and indeed might come to enjoy it once started. As
such, my characterization of law's efforts under this model as coercive does not
apply to this particular relationship, but instead only characterizes the resistance of the child's social parents who do not wish a relationship between the
collaborator(s) and the child to occur (and so deny access). In short, my criticism exaggerates the amount of coercion the model entails by failing to focus on
the most relevant social tie.
I have two responses to this objection. The first is that although the
specific association that law promotes under the model of shared parenting is
the relationship between the reproductive collaborator and the child, it is not
possible to separate a child from her social family for the purposes of building
social capital. Exercise of a right of access to a child requires the cooperation of
the social parents (and presumably it is their interference with the right that
would be actionable). The social parents can also make a considerable difference-without even going as far as to violate the right of access held by a third
party and incur sanctions-to the success with which third party rights are exercised, and thus the social capital benefits that result. Social families can
choose to provide greater access than that is required-or choose to satisfy only
the bare minimum. They can disrupt the exercise of a right of association up to
the point at which courts will step in. And they can have significant influence
over a child-either directly (telling the child to misbehave, to remain silent, or
to try to escape when in the presence of the third party) or indirectly (by their
own hostility towards the third party). Thus although in theory the relationship at issue is that between the collaborator and the child, in practice-when
it comes down to actually going to see the child-the social parents are also
very much involved. Open adoption is premised, after all, on cooperation between adults, not simply between the child and an additional set of parents.
My second response is an elaboration of the first. Because of the neces-
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So far we have seen that the model of shared parenting,
in advocating parental or associational rights, fails to protect
and promote social capital because the model depends on coerced relationships. Coercion is why the other proposal of
this model, to end secrecy and anonymity in collaborative reproduction, also undermines the goal of promoting social
capital. The proposal for greater openness ignores the benefits to social capital that may inhere in public ambiguity
about reproduction. For although secrecy might create tensions among family members, announcing and recording the
sary involvement of the social family in the child's life, building social capital
may actually require the cooperation of the social family. Certainly, rights of
association may be enforced against hostile social parents but it is not clear
that social capital will be built under such circumstances. Social families can,
to a large degree, define the relationship between a child and a third-party.
Social families can encourage the relationship to proceed in a healthy and vibrant manner in a way that will help the formation of long-lasting ties that
have social capital benefits. Or social families can turn the exercise of associational rights into occasions for resistance and moments of suspicion. Social
families, in short, can make the difference between trust and distrust, between
connection and mere association. As such, the objection to my evaluation of the
model overstates the independence of children from their social families, ignoring the difficulty of drawing a clear line that marks the boundary between
where the family ends and the child begins. The objection thus fails to recognize the role that families themselves play in the creation of social capital
formed through ties that technically link only their children to third parties.
The second objection to my evaluation of the model is that family relationships in general are coercive. People are, after all, born into particular
families without choice and when family relationships break down individuals
often resort to law in order to maintain ties. Thus, this second objection suggests, if social capital may be built in families that involve these "coerced" relationships, why may it not also be built through other ties coerced by law?
My response to this objection is consistent with my answers to the first. The
suggestion that shared parenting is only as coercive as other family relationships focuses narrowly on the relationship between a child and the reproductive
collaborator. Certainly, that relationship on its own is similar to the relationship between a child and her social parents: ending up in a relationship because
one is born to social parents is not really less coercive than ending up in a relationship because law requires it. But there is a critical difference in collaborative reproduction, seen if we broaden our sights to consider the context in which
the relationship with the child must occur. Coercion in the case of collaborative
reproduction means, in my mind, coercion of adults; coercion of the social parents who cannot (as my response to the first objection indicates) be ignored.
They are the ones made to allow other parties to visit with their child. This is
quite different from regular family arrangements where the adults are not
forced to interact in ways they would rather not. That is, where a married couple has a child, each parent's relationship with the child proceeds with the
blessing of the other parent. Assessing coercion, then, requires not just focusing on the adult-child relationship but on the adult-adult relationships that are
implicated as well. For this reason, it is not the case that the model of shared
parenting involves no more coercion than that already within regular families.
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facts of a child's origins in the way the model proposes undermines the importance of choices over disclosure of family
bonds. Secrets are, after all, both a threat to intimate relationships and a condition for intimacy. Secrets mark a
boundary between the public and the private, giving private
life much of its meaning and allowing strong family ties to
develop. 93 The proposal for greater openness makes that
boundary much less certain, by coerced exposure of the origins of a child. To put things more simply, the model fails to
see the extent that ambiguity is a prerequisite of family free94
dom.
Of course, there is a conceptual difference between secrets that a family keeps to itself and secrets that individual

family members keep from each other. But in practice the
193. As the philosopher Sissela Bok writes:
Control over secrecy provides a safety valve for individuals in the
midst of communal life-some influence over transactions between the
world of personal experience and the world shared with others. With
no control over such exchanges, human beings would be unable to exercise choice about their lives .... If experience in the shared world
becomes too overwhelming, the sense of identity suffers .... [Clontrol
over secrecy and openness is needed in order to protect identity: the
sense of what we identify ourselves as, through and with. Such control
may be needed to guard solitude, privacy, intimacy, and friendship. It
protects vulnerable beliefs or feelings, inwardness, and the sense of
being set apart: of having or belonging to regions not fully penetrable
to scrutiny, including those of memory and dream; of being someone
who is more, has become more, has more possibilities for the future
than can ever meet the eyes of observers.
BOK, supra note 120, at 20-21. See also James L. Nelson, Genetic Narratives:
Biology, Stories, and the Definition of Family, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 71, 77 (1992)
("Families are significant contexts in which we enjoy intimate relationships,
places in which we can express parts of ourselves which we elsewhere suppress,
places where we can know and be known with a sort of particularity that
doesn't often occur elsewhere.").
194. Consider two examples. First, encountering a parent whose child is of a
different race often gives people pause-leading them to wonder where the
child "came from" in a manner they would not wonder were the parent and
child of the same race. Second, there is a similar sense of puzzlement when
coming across a same-sex couple that suddenly has a child (e.g., seeing a picture in a newspaper of two men and a baby where all the text says is something
like "John and Paul are happy to announce the safe arrival of their daughter
Jennifer, who weighed ....
"). One can be fully in favor of interracial adoption
and gay parenting and yet still wonder about the "origins" of these children:
ambiguities are hard to live with. But the parents' refusal in each case to publicly advertise where these children "came from" is quite empowering. It shuts
off private conduct from public prying. And it makes unconventional choices
about reproduction as worthy of privacy and respect (and not in need of explanation) as reproduction by heterosexual intercourse.
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two are not easily separated. Freedom of families to choose
secrecy from the public must also entail the freedom of individual family members to choose how to arrange truths
among themselves. The model's proposal that a child's genetic origins be reported and accessible makes this clear:
revelation to individual family members requires public record-keeping, whether or not any particular member of the
public will necessarily have access to such records. Secrecy
in collaborative reproduction, then, is a precondition for intimate family ties and the social capital that those relationships represent, even though secrecy can also expose relationships to stress. Just as coerced relationships fail to
produce social capital, coerced exposure of family truths undermines it.
B. Model of Biological Ties
A second model law that may be used to determine family relationships and parenthood in collaborative reproduction is the model of biological ties. 19 5 This model proposes
that law preserve and strengthen social relationships between individuals who share a biological connection, though
what exactly constitutes a biological connection may vary.
Under this model law might consider only the genetic connections that exist in collaborative reproduction. As such, law
would preserve and strengthen relationships between providers of gametes and the resulting children. Alternatively, law
might focus primarily on gestational connections, thus
strengthening the relationship between a mother and the
child she carries and gives birth to, even if (as in gestational
surrogacy) there is no genetic link. Two versions of this
model, representing each of these possibilities, will therefore
be discussed.
1. Genetic Ties
In the first version, the model law focuses on genetic ties.
People have a compelling urge to know their genetic roots
and to be with others who share their roots. Individuals who
are cut off from these roots, the theory goes, never quite recover. As such the genetic version of the model proposes that
law should give priority to genetic-based relationships.
195. See supra note 15.
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Natural parents are, therefore, preferable to adoptive parents, and genetic mothers trump gestational mothers.
This version of the model draws on evidence from the
adoption context about the dire consequences of separating
children from their genetic roots. Adopted children have
been said to grieve at the loss of the birth-mother,196 fear future abandonment,'97 feel guilt because of divided loyalty between their birth parents and adoptive parents'98 and experience an intense longing for their biological parents.199 The
concept of "genealogical bewilderment" describes the identity
confusion that results from not knowing or having contact
with one's genetic family."' This is said to inhibit healthy
development and undermine the formation of close ties with
adoptive parents and with others in adult life." 1 In recent
years, these alleged emotional stresses related to adoption
and separation from genetic parents have resulted in calls for
greater disclosure to adopted children and, in some quarters,
for open adoptions.02
196. See SILBER & DORNER, supra note 173, at 55, 70-74.
197. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 173, at 120.
198. See SILBER & DORNER, supra note 173, at 55, 79.
199. See Kandel, supra note 148, at 198 (citing DAVID KIRK, SHARED FATE: A
THEORY OF ADOPTION AND MENTAL HEALTH 162-65 (1964)).
200. The term was coined by E. Wellisch and developed in H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED.
PSYCHOL. 133 (1964). See Kandel, supra note 148, at 198.
201. See Kandel, supra note 148, at 199 (citing LESLIE M. STEIN & JANET L.
HOOPES, IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE ADOPTED ADOLESCENT 16-18 (1985);
David M. Brodzinsky, Adjustment to Adoption: A Psychosocial Perspective, 7
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 25, 35-40 (1987)). See also HUMPHREY, supra note
113, at 109 (noting that the lack of physical resemblance to family members can
be "an additional hurdle to overcome in the search for a rounded identity");
Nelson, supra note 193, at 81 (arguing that genetic ties are important for family
relationships because of "our interest in perceiving the connections between our
lives and the lives of others--connections which add depth and richness to the
continuing story in which we participate, and which therefore can be referred to
as narrative connections"); A.D. SOROSKY et al., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 113
(1978) (suggesting that the only way for adoptees to resolve inner conflicts is to
have contact with their biological parents). But see Marquis & Detweiler, Does
Adopted Mean Different? An AttributionalAnalysis, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1054 (1985) (rejecting the claims of psychological harm of adoption).
202. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 173, at 119. See also Katz, supra note
104, at 780. Katz argues:
we should make certain that genetic information is not only available
for every child ... conceived [by gamete donation] but also-as the
child's birthright-identifying information is provided. If gamete donors are unwilling to have their sons and daughters meet them face to
face one day, they should not participate in the creation of children by
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Because genetic ties are so fundamentally important,
this version of the model asserts, law should act to preserve
and promote genetic-based relationships. As such, law's assignment of parenthood is simple: the parents of a child are
the genetic parents, regardless of the involvement of anybody
else in the reproductive process. There are of course wellknown instances of law doing exactly that. In Anna J. v.
Mark C.,2"' for example, the California Court of Appeals focused on genetic ties to reject a gestational surrogate's claim
to motherhood. The court decided to resolve the surrogate's
claim just as it would "resolve the question of a man's claim
to paternity ...when blood tests positively exclude him as a
candidate.""4 Since there was no genetic link between the
surrogate and the child, the court held she was not the natural mother." 5 In another case, the Tennessee Supreme Court
found that an interest in avoiding genetic parenthood is as
6
significant as the parental interest in child-rearing."
2. Gestational Ties
In the second version of the biological model, law focuses
on relationships that are gestationally linked. As such, law
should preserve and strengthen the relationship between a
mother who bears a child and the child produced in collaborative reproduction, even if the two lack a genetic connection.
What counts in determining family ties are pregnancy and
birth.
This version of the model points to evidence that the experience of carrying and bearing a child establishes an unusually strong bond between the gestational mother and the
artificial insemination or egg donation.
Id. For an overview of the findings of researchers that adoption creates psychological difficulties for adoptees, see D.K. Deutsch et al., Overrepresentation
of Adoptees in Children with the Attention Deficit Disorder,12 BEHAV. GENETIC
231, 231-38 (1982).
203. 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct.. App. 1991), affd sub nom. Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993). On appeal, the California Supreme Court did not, however, base its holding on the importance of genetic
ties. 851 P.2d at 784.
204. 286 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
205. Further, applying Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the
court held that the gestational surrogate had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in her relationship with the child she gave birth to because such a
right has not traditionally been protected and would interfere with the rights of
the genetic parents. Id. at 379-80.
206. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
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child."7 Research suggests an important prenatal bond between a gestational mother and the child she carries.0 8
Studies indicate that women often experience loyalty toward
the fetus early in pregnancy, and that quickening is an especially important point for the development of feelings of attachment." 9 While both biological parents may interact with
the fetus, pregnant mothers seem to have a stronger sense of
the fetus as a separate individual.210 And women often mourn
" ' There is also evidence
the loss of even a nonviable fetus.21
of
postnatal bonding, especially during the critical period following birth when the mother and child experience strong
feelings of attachment for each other. 2 Different studies illustrate the importance of early and secure emotional ties between children and their parents to child-development.2 8 Fi207. Professor Rothman adds an additional twist to this version of the model.
Rothman suggests that parenthood derives from intimate social relationships but she recharacterizes the biological connection between a gestational mother and the
child as a specifically social link, thus warranting her recognition as the legal
parent. Id. at 37-39. Rothman writes: "The mother, as a social being is responding socially to the experience of carrying her baby." Id. at 97. In Rothman's view, a gestational surrogate should always be free to change her mind
about relinquishing the child she carries because she is the one with the
strongest social relationship with the newborn. Id. at 239. Rothman compares
this relationship with that between the contracting parents in surrogacy and
the child. Prior to a child's birth, Rothman argues, a genetic father may at
most only begin to establish a social relationship with the child through his relationship with the gestational mother. Id. at 104-05. And he can only develop
a truly nurturing relationship after birth. Id. at 214-23. In surrogacy, Rotham
claims, the genetic father has an especially limited relationship with the childdependent wholly on the surrogate's cooperation-and the same is true of the
genetic (non-gestational) mother. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD (1989).

MOTHERHOOD 98 (1989).

208. See Hill, supra note 12, at 397.
209. See id. (citing Fletcher & Evans, Maternal Bonding in Early Fetal Ultrasound Examinations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392 (1983); Leifer, Psychological Changes Accompanying Pregnancy and Motherhood, 95 GENETIC PSYCHOL.
MONOGRAPHS 55 (1977)).

210. See id. (citing Stainton, The Fetus: A Growing Member of the Family, 34
FAM. REL. 321, 322-24 (1985)).
211. See id. (citing Kennell, Slayter & Klaus, The Mourning Response of Parents to the Death of a Newborn Baby, 283 NEW ENG. J. MED. 344 (1970)).
212. See id. at 394-400 (citing numerous studies).
213. See Hill, supra note 12, at 402. Hill notes that it is well established that
infants failing to form a bond with any adult are likely to lack the ability to
form deep and enduring relationships later in life. Id. (citing FRUIBERG, EARLY
CHILDHOOD BIRTHRIGHT: IN DEFENSE OF MOTHERING 51-62 (1977); Singer,

Brodzinsky & Ramsay, Mother-Infant Attachment in Adoptive Families, 56
CHILD DEV. 1543 (1985)). Hill cites one study that found a high correlation be-
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nally, there is evidence that women who surrender children
shortly after birth suffer severe psychological distress. A
mother will often feel separation anxiety when apart from
her child even for a short period. 14 Moreover, writings in the
adoption context suggest that permanent separation may
lead to a deep sense of loss, long-lasting depression, recurring
dreams about loss and reunion, a greater level of protectiveness towards remaining children, long-term conflicts and interpersonal difficulties, marital discord and even reduced fertility. 15 These separation effects are thought to be especially
strong for mothers who are compelled to relinquish a child.216
Citing this evidence of bonding, the gestational ties version of the biological model argues that law should protect
the relationship between gestational mothers and the children they carry. In the surrogacy context, then, law should
recognize the birth-mother as the legal mother of a child,
even where she lacks a genetic link to the child or previously
agreed to turn over the child to a contracting couple.1 Notions of motherhood, in this version of the biological model,
depend on having been pregnant with and giving birth to a
child because of the important relationship that results.

tween insecurely attached infants and those who experience a higher level of
non-maternal care in the first year of life. Id. (citing Belsky & Rovine, Nonmaternal Care in the First Year of Life and the Security of Infant-ParentAttachment, 59 CHILD DEV. 157 (1988)). Other studies show that the quality of attachment in infancy may affect the IQ of the child, id. (citing van Ijzendoorn &
van Vliet-Visser, The Relationship Between Quality of Attachment in Infancy
and IQ in Kindergarten, 149 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 23 (1988)), and the development of the child's sense of self-identity, thus affecting the child's ability to cope
with various environments such as schools, id. (citing Singer, Brodzinsky &
Ramsay, Mother-Infant Attachment in Adoptive Families, 56 CHILD DEV. 1543
(1985)).
214. See id. at 405 (citing Hock, McBride & Gnezda, Maternal Separation
Anxiety: Mother-Infant Separation from the Maternal Perspective, 60 CHILD
DEV. 793 (1989)).
215. See Hill, supra note 12, at 405-06 (citing Deykin, Campbell & Patti, The
Post-Adoption Experience of Surrendering Parents, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 271 (1984); Mille & Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological Bereavement, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 411 (1985); Rynearson, Relinquishment and Its Maternal Complications, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 338
(1982)).
216. See id. at 406 (citing Deykin, Campbell & Patti, The Post-Adoption Experience of SurrenderingParents,54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 271 (1984)).
217. See FIELD, supra note 136, at 151 (arguing that a surrogate mother
should have the right to renounce the contract up until the time she turns over
the child to the contracting couple); ROTHMAN, supra note 207, at 239.
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3. Evaluation
Neither version of the biological model offers law a way
to promote social capital. First, the premise of the model is
highly questionable. Biology, it turns out, may not matter to
the extent the model asserts. The evidence that genetic ties
count in the way the first version of the model claims that
they do-that contact with genetic roots is critical for identity
and stability-is widely disputed. "18 The experience with
adoption is telling: adopted children, by and large, are as well
adjusted as children who remain with their genetic parents."'
At the very least, it is clear that for many people, such as fathers who abandon their children, parents who beat their
kids, relatives who do not speak to each other and even
anonymous sperm donors,"' genetic ties do not matter much
at all.2
The evidence of a special bond, both prenatal and postnatal, between a gestational mother and a child, underlying the
second version of the model, is also much debated." It is not
clear whether mother-infant bonding represents a biological
link or response, or whether it results from social factors that
motivate a woman to behave in a certain way towards her
baby. 3 Some studies, in this regard, show that bonding is
not universal among women and that it is influenced by socioeconomic factors.224 Recent research also undermines the
notion of postnatal bonding, or of a critical period in which
the mother is likely to develop strong feelings of attach218. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE
POLITICS OF PARENTING 173-81 (1993) (discussing weaknesses of literature on

the importance of genetic ties); HUMPHREY, supra note 113, at 66-67
(concluding from a review of the literature on genealogical bewilderment that it
"should be accorded no more than a modest influence").
219. See LASKER & BORG, supra note 104, at 163.
220. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.

221. See HUMPHREY, supra note 113, at 73-74 (reporting that adoptees with
a compulsion to search tend to have personality problems and disturbed family
relationships, and noting that in Britain when birth records were opened in
1975 only a very small minority (perhaps 2%) of adoptees ever sought access to
them).
222. See generally Hill, supra note 12, at 394 n.219 (providing citations to
studies expressing a range of viewpoints on this subject).
223. See id. at 398.
224. See id. (citing Kennell & Klaus, Mother-Infant Bonding: Weighing the
Evidence, 4 DEv. REV. 275 (1984); Egeland & Farber, Infant-Mother Attachment: Factors Related to its Development and Changes Over Time, 55 CHILD
DEV. 753 (1984)).
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ment.2"5 As one commentator concludes, "it remains to be
proven that the bonding process is qualitatively distinct from
feelings of attachment for the child developed by others in the
procreative process."226 Even if postnatal bonding does occur,
at most it matters only if breaking or precluding the bond ab
initio will result in psychological harm to the mother since all
parents can come to develop strong ties with their children
whether or not they are biologically linked.2 Further, although many studies indicate the importance for childdevelopment of early and secure emotional ties between children and their parents, 2 8 "[t]here is absolutely no evidence ... that the child must form this relationship with a
biological parent." 9 Indeed, very young children can quickly
form bonds with any adult.2 ' Moreover, as to claims of the
psychological harm caused by relinquishment of a child,
drawn largely from the adoption context, it certainly seems
plausible that:
surrendering mothers in the adoption situation are more
susceptible to the trauma of relinquishment than gestational hosts in the collaborative-reproductive arrangement
precisely because the adoptive mother is under no legal
compulsion to surrender a child even where she informally
has agreed to do so before birth. Indeed, it is likely that
many surrendering mothers vacillate as to their decision
for some time up to, and in some cases even after, the
birth of the child. This wavering may aggravate feelings
of loss once the decision is made to surrender the child. In
short, expectations may influence feelings. If the postrelinquishment experience of birth mothers is not at all
related to their previous feelings regarding the child, then
it is possible that women who do not expect to raise the
225. See id. at 399 (citing Chess & Thomas, Infant Bonding: Mystique and
Reality, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 213 (1982); Herbert et. al., Mother-ToInfant Bonding, 23 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 205 (1982)).

226. Id.
227. See id. at 400.
228. See Hill, supra note 12, at 402. It is well-established that infants failing
to form a bond with any adult are likely to lack the ability to form deep and enduring relationships later in life. See id. at 402 (citing FRUIBERG, EARLY
CHILDHOOD BIRTHRIGHT: IN DEFENSE OF MOTHERING 51-62 (1977); Singer et.
al., Mother-Infant Attachment in Adoptive Families, 56 CHILD DEV. 1543
(1985)).
229. Id. at 403.
230. See id. (citing T. VERNAY & J. KELLY, THE SECRET LIFE OF THE UNBORN
CHILD 149-50 (1981)).
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child may be relatively less affected by the relinquishment. 3'

Finally, when considering the harm caused by relinquishment, one should take into account the harm to those
whose expectations of receiving a child, through a surrogacy
or other agreement, are thwarted."2
Because this evidence for the natural significance of biological (both genetic and gestational) connections is so problematic, the biological model for determining familial relationships rests on a weak foundation. As such, the model
offers an uncertain mechanism by which law can generate social capital and its associated benefits. In this model, social
capital outcomes hinge on a single fact: the significance of
biological ties. If the biological tie turns out to be unimportant in the way the model imagines, then it leaves law with
nothing with which to create social capital. Put differently,
all that distinguishes the biological model from a proposal
that law randomly match individuals is the importance of the
biological fact. Should that fact be less critical than the
model presumes, then law's efforts to build social capital will
be wasted.
In addition to the problematic premise of the model,
there is another reason it fails to promote social capital.
Even assuming that (a) biological ties are important, (b) people "feel" more connected to others biologically related to
them than they do to biological strangers and (c) biological
ties can lead to social connections, why should biology be
law's mechanism for building social capital at all? Even
agreeing, in other words, that law can build social capital by
focusing on biological links, why should this be the method
that law chooses?
A focus on biology would straight-jacket law from the
start.233 Because one can easily imagine a variety of social
231. Id. at 406 (citations omitted).
232. See Hill, supra note 12, at 407. Hill suggests that only women who have
previously had children should be permitted to be surrogates since they are
more capable of predicting the feelings experienced during pregnancy. Id. at
416 n.314. He also advocates greater psychological screening of prospective
surrogates to weed out those more likely to face relinquishment difficulties. Id.
233. Kathleen Nolan, What to Do About Parenting,14 J. HEALTH POL., POLY
& L. 827, 831 (1989) reminds us also that reproductive technologies to produce
genetically linked offspring may impoverish the meaning of generativity "if we
allow genetic procreation to become too precious, too central to our self-worth,
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connections, some of which have a biological basis and some
of which do not, shifting law's focus to ties that are biologically based seems unwise. It would restrict both the amount
of social capital that law may create-by turning law's attention away from social capital that could be formed in the absence of a biological connection-and the sites where law
could act to build social capital. The biological model narrowly reduces the range of social relations that law promotes,
relations that might have significant social capital benefits.
Indeed, in some instances the biological model will destroy
social capital by shifting law away from protecting and promoting social ties that lack a biological basis.
Building social capital for collective benefits may require
experimentation, innovation and multiple approaches of design. Such experimentation can lead law to mechanisms for
creating social capital that are highly effective, perhaps more
effective than a focus on biological connections. But the biological model forecloses that possibility by mandating, once
and for all, the specific program that law is to follow.
The biological model asserts that this restriction is justified because in fact biological ties are more easily and more
naturally formed. The model thus claims to offer law a shortcut, to ease law's burden, by prescribing its course of direction in creating social capital. But even if evidence of the importance of biological connections is accepted, this very prescription limits social capital. The decision of what types of
social ties are to be law's focus as it protects and promotes
social capital should not be made in advance. The biological
model, after all, does not claim that biological ties are always
easily formed, or that they are always more important than
other types of ties, or that they can always be the basis for
sustained social relationships. All that the model suggests
(and all that its evidence, in its best light, supports) is that in
general, or in many cases, biological ties are significant. In
any given instance, the model recognizes, biological ties may
or may not matter and so may or may not be a suitable basis
for the creation of social connections.234 Precisely because all
that the model claims is what is true in many cases (yet not
invariably), a decision in advance to focus on biological ties
and not other ties represents a poor choice for law's program
too vital to our sense of family."
234. See supra Part III.B.2.
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to create social capital. For it means that law will have to
ignore situations where it can create social capital, because of
the absence of a biological tie. Therefore, because of the restraint the biological model imposes, law will fail to promote
social capital where it otherwise would be able to do so.
The seriousness of the restriction that this model imposes is most evident where biological ties compete directly
for law's protection with other social connections. Take, for
example, the case of two women who jointly raise a child,
both acting as mothers. After some period, the biological
mother terminates the arrangement and leaves. Law's focus
on biological ties to define familial relationships and its rejection of the long-term social connection between the child and
the other mother works directly to diminish social capital.
Consider another example, the case of a genetic parent who
abandons a child but then shows up after ten years seeking
legal recognition. The biological model suggests that law
should value the biological parent's claim and prefer it over
that of another adult without a genetic link, who has nonetheless developed a deep relationship with the child and
served as a parent. Social capital does not benefit by such
choices, mandated by the biological model.2 5
The suggestion that law will succeed on average, or in
most instances, in creating social capital if it focuses on biological links does not resolve this difficulty. Why, after all,
should law follow a model that leads to success only on average, or even in most cases, when more is attainable? Why,
when law can protect and promote social capital in the absence of a biological link should it fail to do so? When a relationship falls outside law's scope only because it lacks a biological connection, then law's neglecting to protect and
promote the social capital the relationship represents is a

235. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 80 (Burnett Books 1979) (1973). Goldstein argues that law

should emphasize psychological parenting:
[TIhe status of parent ...requires a continuing interaction between

adult and child to survive. It can be broken by the adult parent by
"chance," by the establishment of a new adult-child relationship, which
we call common-law adoption, or by "choice" through a more formal legal process we have come to call adoption. It is the real tie-the reality of an ongoing relationship-that is crucial.., and that demands

the protection of the state through law.
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clear failure. For where the only difference is the missing
biological connection, the model's justification for not protecting the social capital inherent in the relationship must be
the importance of the biological link itself. But the biological
connection is the method this model offers law, not the goal;
law's goal must remain to create social capital for collective
benefits. Even accepting the model's claims about the significance of biological connections, this advance restriction on
the types of relationships that law may preserve will inevitably overlook some social ties that nonetheless have social
capital benefits.
Finally, we are unable to salvage the biological model by
treating it as offering only a general rule of preferring biological ties, which law may ignore in particular instances to
promote social capital. For if the model only aims to direct
law towards biological relations presumptively, but not conclusively, it would be like having no model at all. If law is to
generally prefer biological relations, but remains free to ignore them in favor of other ties more suited to building social
capital in particular instances, then the same outcomes
would be achieved if law were simply to select the ties that
maximize social capital in the first place. Whether law initially looks to biological ties, or whether it first looks to other
forms of ties, if the criteria for their evaluation (social capital
benefits) remain the same, so will the result; order does not
matter. Thus, recasting the biological model as one offering
not a mandate but a general rule means the model provides
no strategy at all for law to protect and promote social capital.
C. Model of Contract and Intent
1. Overview of the Model
A third and final model by which law might determine
family relationships and parenthood in collaborative reproduction is the model of contract and intent. 2 36 Under this
model law preserves and respects the relationships that people themselves bargain for. Rather than concern itself with
the importance or irrelevance of any particular basis (such as
a biological link) for relationships, law should permit people
236. See supra note 15.
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to freely make their own arrangements by consent and contract. Furthermore, law should settle relationship disputes
just as it settles other contract disputes. In determining who
is the parent of a child produced by collaborative reproduction, law should ask who the participating parties intended to
be a parent, and look to a signed agreement or some other
evidence of the parties' intent.
Professor Hill is a strong proponent of the model of contract and intent and his argument is exemplary. 7 Professor
Hill argues that in collaborative reproduction courts should
simply look to what the collaborating parties intendedspecifically whom the intended parents were-in order to determine parental rights.2 8 Original intent trumps subsequent claims in Hill's method.2 39 He proposes that there be a
requirement of express designation of the intended parents in
any contract for collaborative reproduction, as well as judicial
review of the contract to force all the parties to announce
their intentions before reproduction proceeds." '
Hill offers three justifications for recognizing the intended parents in collaborative reproduction as the
"procreators," and thus the legal parents of a child. The first
is a "but for" argument of causation: treat the intended parents as the legal parents because "while all of the players in
the procreative arrangement are necessary in bringing a
child into the world, the child would not have been born but

237. Numerous other commentators also argue that law should focus on contracts in collaborative reproduction. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 136, at 42029; ROBERTSON, supra note 10, at 131. See also John E. Durkin, Reproductive
Technology and the New Family: Recognizing the Other Mother, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 327 (1993) (arguing that enforceable contracts between lesbians be used to protect parental rights of the non-biological mother). But see
FIELD, supra note 136, at 151-52. Field has doubts that surrogacy contracts
should be permitted at all but argues that if such contracts are allowed the gestational mother should have the right to renounce the contract up until the
time she turns over the child to the contracting couple. Once the child moves
into the couple's home, however, the rights of the gestational mother should be
terminated. Field asserts that if the biological mother renounces the contract
then the genetic father should not be able to prevail in a custody dispute unless
the mother is shown to be unfit. But, Field suggests, the father should still be
able to develop a relationship with the child that would be legally protected
(and he would, in such instances, be liable for the child's support). Id.
238. Hill, supra note 12, at 413-20.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 355.
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for the efforts of the intended parents."241 According to Hill,
"the intended parents are the first cause, or the prime movers, of the procreative relationship" while "the others are participants only after the intention and action of the intended
parents to have a child."242 In addition, because no particular
biological participants are necessary, no one but the intended
parents are in the unique relationship with the child of being
the "but for" cause of the child's existence.243
The second argument Hill makes in favor of the model of
contract and intent is that law should hold gestational hosts
and donors of gametes to their original agreement not to seek
parental rights.244 Hill argues for enforcement of this agreement because it is the basis for the involvement of collaborators in the procreative relationship242 and because the intended parents rely, financially and emotionally, on the
agreement being met.246
Finally, Hill's third reason for intentional parenting is to
avoid uncertainty. Permitting a gestational host or genetic
collaborator to claim parenthood encourages lengthy litigation over parentage that can harm the parties involved.'
Such litigation and disputes subject children to uncertain
(and later changes in) custody or visitation arrangements.248
The model of contract and intent, in short, requires parties to choose in advance the rules that law is to follow; law's
task in determining family relationships is simply to implement those choices.249 Some courts have adopted this model
to determine parenthood in collaborative reproduction and
notions of intent also lurk in some state statutes governing
241. Id. at 415.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Hill, supra note 12, at 415.
245. Id. at 415-16.
246. Id. at 416.
247. Id. at 417.
248. Id.
249. See Marjorie M. Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood:An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, WIS. L. REV. 297, 324-25
(1990). Schultz agrees with Hill that contractual intent should trump other
claims for parental rights, and argues that courts can easily determine the intent of parties in collaborative reproduction. Id. Further, Schultz suggests
that law should respect intent because it means treating individuals with dignity: failing to enforce surrogacy arrangements reinforces the notion that
women are unable to rationally enter into contracts (e.g., because of hormonal
changes during pregnancy that affect decision-making). Id. at 384.
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surrogacy arrangements.25 ° In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court ultimately focused on contractual intent (not genetic ties) to determine parentage in a gestational
surrogacy arrangement, thus denying the surrogate any role
in the life of the child.25 ' "She who intended to bring about
the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own," the
court concluded, "is the natural mother."252 An earlier court
went so far in its focus on intent to suggest that a child conceived through artificial insemination does not even have a
natural father, reasoning that "[t]he anonymous donor of the
sperm cannot be considered the 'natural father' as he is no
more responsible for the use made of his sperm than is the
donor of blood or a kidney."253
2. Evaluation
The model of contract and intent avoids the flaws of the
other two models we have considered. It does not restrict law
in the manner of the model of biological ties; as such, it allows for greater innovation and imagination in law's pursuit
of social capital. 54 Further, unlike the model of shared par250. A Virginia statute distinguishes between gestational surrogacy and instances where the surrogate is also the genetic mother. The statute designates
the intended parents the legal parents if the surrogacy contract has court approval. But the statute's definition of intended parents does not extend beyond
married couples. If the surrogacy contract has not been approved by a court,
then the statute designates the intended mother the legal mother only if she
donated the genetic material. If the intended mother did not provide genetic
material, then the surrogate may refuse to give up the baby and is recognized
(along with her husband if he too was a party to the agreement) as the legal
parent. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156-162 (Supp. 1991). An Arkansas statute also
presumes the intended mother to be the legal mother in surrogacy so long as
she is married to the biological father or the parties used sperm provided by an
anonymous donor. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Supp. 1991). Finally, under
Option A of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Contraception Act, surrogacy contracts are enforceable (and the intended parents are deemed the legal parents) unless either party breaks the agreement before conception or the
surrogate changes her mind within 180 days of the last insemination. See
FIELD, supra note 136, at 156-58.
251. 851 P.2d 776, 782, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993).
252. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
253. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 498 (Cal. 1968).
254. Other commentators reject a reliance on intent in surrogacy because
they see it as biased against women. See, e.g., Anne Goodwin, Determinationof
Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo Transplantation,and Gestational
Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L.Q. 275, 287 (1993) (arguing that intentbased parentage "reflects a bias against the pregnant woman because, unlike
the genetic/intended parents, the gestational carrier's physical and social rela-
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enting, the model of contract and intent focuses specifically
on voluntary ties, protecting connections that are freely chosen rather than forcing those that would not otherwise occur.
However, the model of contract and intent fails to promote social capital. From a social capital perspective the difficulty with this model lies precisely in its assignment of a
limited role to law. It envisages law as an enforcer of the
facts and terms of relationships to which individuals, at some
prior point in time, agreed. Yet law, if it is to promote social
capital, has a greater stake in those relationships than the
model acknowledges. By curtailing this larger interest, the
model fails to build social capital for two related reasons.
First, the focus under this model is the prior intentions
of the parties. As with the biological model, law is to look
through a predetermined lens. Although perhaps less restrictive than the biological model-in that a variety of ties
could be created in advance by the parties to a contract-this
model nonetheless removes from law's focus some relationships that would have social capital benefits. The difficulty is
that many types of social ties are strong sites of social capital
but lack the requisite moment of intent and contract. Relationships, after all, often occur without anybody ever intending them to do so. Yet their value as generators of social
capital is not diminished because intent was never specified,
or a contract was never signed. Take the example of a sperm
donor, tracked down by his teenage daughter after the death
of her mother. The two develop a strong bond. The donor
may have never intended a relationship with his daughter,
but the relationship does not become less significant for lack
of intent. And critically, it is a relationship that law should
promote in its efforts to build social capital. The model of
contract and intent would shift law's focus away from relationships of this kind, and in the same way that the model of
biology turns law away from non-biological ties, it prevents
useful experimentation in creating social capital.
Relationships may also occur despite the intentions of the
parties involved. The model of contract and intent would ditionship with the potential child dramatically changes as her pregnancy progresses and when she experiences childbirth"); Kandel, supra note 148, at 193
(arguing that the "variability of maternal emotion, especially in the hormonally
charged states of pregnancy and childbirth [makes it]... inhumane to rely
upon contractual commitment to determine natural motherhood").
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rect law away from these types of relationships as well, even
though they may have substantial social capital benefits. A
man who declares he wants nothing to do with his wife's illegitimate child, for example, may nonetheless find himself
providing care and support. His announcements-perhaps
duly recorded and signed-might be quite contrary to his actual behavior. Indeed, loudly disowning the child might even
facilitate this man assuming a parental role (say, because it
saves his pride, or meets the expectations of his own parents
or friends). Alternatively, a surrogate may intend at the outset to have no relationship with the child she carries but then
find herself developing a deep bond.
The model of contract and intent also takes for granted
that intent precedes a relationship. But intent may only occur during the course of a relationship or may only be evident
or supplied in retrospect. A foster parent, for example, may
say she will not adopt a child, but then go ahead and adopt
anyway. After the adoption takes place, this parent might
say she always planned to adopt. It is not that she is lying,
and she might not even have changed her mind: the way we
view past behavior and feelings may depend, in part, on current circumstances.
Moreover, intent may not result in any sort of relationship at all. A man may intend to be the father of a child, for
example, but then run off before the child is born. A second
man may be reluctant to be that child's father but eventually
become quite attached. Law would not promote social capital
if it recognized the relationship of the first man to the child,
where intent was clearly declared, but denied that of the second, where intent is much less apparent.
Because the model of contract and intent directs law to
the intentions of parties as the basis for measuring relationships and weighing competing claims, it denies law's interest
in a variety of other social ties where intent is missing, or
less clear, or where it seems irrelevant. From a social capital
perspective, the model thus restricts law by obscuring its interest in social ties conducive to social capital but lacking
evidence of intent. In short, the model removes from law's
focus promotion and protection-social ties that nonetheless
serve social capital goals.
The second way the model of contract and intent curtails
law's larger interest in social relationships is by removing
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choices as to the content or terms of relationships from law

and leaving those choices to individuals.255 The model draws
no distinctions among the types of contracts and the varieties
of intent that may exist. It only requires that each result
from an informed choice. But some such choices are likely to
be more effective at generating social capital than others.
Over time, some might work to diminish social capital. If law
is to build social capital, it cannot be neutral regarding the
content or terms of relationships in the way the model of contract and intent makes it. As such, the model provides a
highly restricted role for law and, therefore, undermines the
program of protecting and promoting ties that generate social
capital.
It is important to be clear what is meant by this criticism. The argument is not that law's interest lies in monitoring who forms social ties. Rather, the suggestion here is
that quite apart from which particular individuals enter social relationships, law has an interest in the content of those
relationships. Different relationships, irrespective of which
individuals are involved, may have very different social capital implications.
Take, for example, the case of a divorced woman with
four children who remarries. The couple signs a contract
specifying that the new husband does not intend to be the father of the children and intends to assume no parental responsibilities. This new union promotes social capital and,
therefore, will be encouraged by law. But the content of the
arrangement is quite different. The specification that the
husband will assume no parental responsibilities is troubling
from a social capital perspective, because it represents a very
limited commitment by the husband to his new wife's children, a diluted social relationship. The husband has used the

255. See, e.g., Durkin, supra note 237, at 344-45. Durkin writes:
When the... partners determine that they want to raise a child together they must determine the rights and obligations of each coparent and put this into a written contract ....
In the contract, the
parties may wish to establish financial obligations to... partially or
fully support the child. The parties could agree upon custody and visitation rights should the couple separate in the future. The contract
could include numerous other provisions, such as a stipulation of the
child's surname, the faith under which the child would be raised, or
any other parental right or duty that the parties wish to stipulate.
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mechanism of intent to define his relationship with the children in such a way as to incur minimal obligation. His intent
undermines social capital because it produces instability, as
the husband is free to leave the arrangement without penalty. Although the decision to enter this social arrangement
thus benefits social capital, the terms of it do not. Alternatively, the content of an arrangement that promotes longterm commitment, reliability and stability better serves social capital.
From a social capital perspective, law strongly encourages the formation of new social ties, such as among the individuals of the preceding example. But law's interest in the
content that those ties take, quite independent of who forms
them, is substantial. Another example is that of adoption.
From a social capital perspective, law should encourage the
formation of family units through adoption. At the same
time, law should specify the rights and responsibilities associated with adopting a child in order to ensure strong ties.
The model of contract and intent removes from law influence
over the terms of a relationship, allowing individual participants to work out and agree to them on their own.256 The
256. Commentators frequently confuse the distinction between the freedom
to enter relationships and the freedom to determine what relationships are to
mean. One commentator, for example, suggests that "by freeing families from
biology and allowing families to be formed in the marketplace, assisted reproductive technologies move us closer towards a world of private ordering, where
not only the form but also the content and the extent of family obligations may
become the product of individual choice." Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive
Technology and the Threat to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951
(1996). But this concern assumes that the content of family relationships
formed through non-collaborative reproduction is always subject to regulation
whereas the content of familial relationships formed through collaborative reproduction is never subject to regulation. Whether or not law regulates a certain type of relationship is a question wholly apart from the way that relation-

ship

arises.

This commentator takes

for granted

that collaborative

reproduction necessarily requires the application of the model of contract and

intent-and that in rejecting such a model there is no alternative, and so there
can be no collaborative reproduction. Rao, as such, writes:
biological bonds, because reflexive and irrevocable, may prove more
reliable than voluntarily assumed contractual commitments.

When

family members come together as a matter of choice, on the other
hand, their commitment to each other may accordingly become both
contingent and revocable ....
[P]arenthood by consent may encourage

the attitude that family relationships can be freely entered and exited,
accepted or rejected.
Id. at 965. But if law can regulate the content of biological relationships, then
it can also regulate the content of family ties formed through collaborative re-
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production. Discarding the model of contract and intent, in short, does not also
require discarding collaborative reproduction. BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD,
THE DIVORCE CULTURE 129-81 (1997) also confuses the choice to enter relationships with the choice to define what relationships will mean in her claim that
expanded definitions of family produce weaker family ties. Carl E. Schneider,
Bioethics and the Family, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 819 makes a similar error in his
criticism of courts that extend marital protections (and obligations) to couples
that, although not actually married, function like other married couples.
Schneider writes:
Marriage represents a specially serious and binding commitment two
people make to each other. The commitment forms the basis for
treating spouses in special ways. Of course, people don't have to marry
in order to make such commitments, and some unmarried couples may
be as solidly bound as any husband and wife. But unless people go
through the public affirmation of the commitment that marriage constitutes, the law cannot know that they have made it .... In addition,
there is a slippery-slope problem ....
Marriage provides... a brightline rule .... [O]nce a court starts asking whether a non-marital relationship is the functional equivalent of marriage, it starts a process in
which it compares the case at hand with the weakest case in which a
couple has been found to have achieved the functional equivalent of
marriage. That case then becomes a precedent, and the process begins
again ....
At the end of the day lies the risk that extending the regime of functional equivalents will tend to assimilate relatively transient and shallow relationships to marriage ... [and so] erode the special qualities of marriage and reduce marriage to just one more "life
style choice."
Id. at 833-34. But the meaning that relationships will have is not independent
of law. Extending the definition of marriage or family to cover a larger number
of social ties does not mean that the definition becomes meaningless, because
law can continue to regulate the content such relationships take. Marriage is
not special because it is a special word; it is special because of the particular
rights and obligations it entails. It does not follow that in expanding the notion
of who is to be covered by those rights and obligations that they disappear or
become subject to individual modification. Indeed, when courts expand such
rights and obligations to cover social relationships that do not formally meet
the definition of marriage or family, it is individual choice as to content of relationships that is likely to be upset, rather than the definition of marriage or
family itself. As such, Schneider gets things exactly backwards. Law's interest
in the meaning of social relationships is not served by being stingy about who
may enter them; it is served by tightening the meaning itself. (Schneider would
thus do better to criticize not deep relationships that look like marriage but
marriages that do not look like deep relationships: for example, marriages for
immigration purposes, marriages that happen or end quickly (and lead to more
marriage) and marriages in which spouses are abusive). Finally, one of the
cases that Schneider cites as exemplifying courts wrongly expanding on the
definition of family involved a homosexual couple (and parental protection). Id.
at 833 (citing Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)). Schneider
must, then, fail to see the irony of his thesis. The couple in that case could not
get married, although all the evidence suggests they certainly would have. Extending marital rights and obligations to that couple would be highly consistent
with promoting marriage as entailing a special obligation. Schneider, in confusing choice of terms with choice of relationship, thus undermines his own
purpose to protect marriage and family.
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model, in minimizing law's ability to specify or regulate content, thus largely disarms law in its quest to promote social
capital. Law may encourage a variety of social connections
because of the social capital benefits that result. But once
social ties are entered, law has an interest in defining the
terms to ensure that the social capital benefits are not
stripped away by the terms of social connections.
D. Principlesof Social Capital
Taken together, the three models for determining familial ties and parenthood in collaborative reproduction provide
three principles by which law can protect and promote social
capital as it regulates the family. First, the analysis of the
model of shared parenting indicated that social capital depends on relationships that are free from coercion. Second,
the analysis of the model of biological ties showed that law
should not be restricted to promoting only certain types of social relationships if it is to generate social capital. Finally,
the evaluation of the model of contract and intent revealed
that law should not be denied its interest in the terms or content of social relationships, because of the social capital implications.
These principles from collaborative reproduction can
thus be summarized in the following way. Law creates social
capital by promoting and protecting (a) a variety of family
ties that are (b) voluntarily entered by individuals, and
where (c) law regulates the content or terms of those relationships once they are formed. Conversely, law fails to generate social capital for collective benefits if it recognizes family ties among only some individuals but not others, where it
coerces people to enter or not to enter family relationships or
where it leaves the terms of those relationships entirely to
individual choice. Against these three principles, law's success in promoting social capital through its regulation of
family relationships may be measured.
IV.

LEGAL REGULATION OF THE FAMILY: THE SOCIAL CAPITAL
APPROACH

With these three principles we are now able to evaluate
more closely law's regulation of family life and to begin to redirect law to serve our common interests. Having focused
narrowly on legal regulation of family relationships in the
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specific context of collaborative reproduction, we may now
think more broadly. The final part of this article applies the
lessons of collaborative reproduction to law's regulation of
family in general. The three principles generated from collaborative reproduction provide a way to evaluate law's
regulation of family in a variety of contexts. In order to illustrate this possibility, we consider several instances of legal
regulation of family relationships: (A) presumptions of legitimacy, (B) the constitutional rights of unwed fathers and
(C) an assignment of parenthood in artificial insemination.
In each case, the purpose will be to apply the principles from
collaborative reproduction in order to evaluate law's effectiveness at promoting social capital and to suggest how to
make law more responsive to our shared interests." 7
A. Presumptionsof Legitimacy
In regulating relationships between married couples and
their children, law has long treated children conceived during
marriage as children of the marriage. At common law, this
"presumption of legitimacy," known as Lord Mansfield's
' meant that any child born to a married woman was
Rule, 58
considered the child of her husband as well. This was so
even if the father was absent at the time of conception. As
one court put it, "[i]f a husband, not physically incapable, was
within the four seas of England during the period of gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on
This presumption of legitimacy prevented
his paternity." '
6°
third parties from bringing actions to establish fatherhood.
Legitimacy is still largely presumed under statutory law today, and in many states the presumption is irrebuttable."'
257. There is no particular logic to the choice of instances of legal regulation
considered here. The purpose of this article has always been large: to understand how law, in its regulation of all areas of family life, might be brought
closer to meeting our collective needs. As such, the examples considered in this
section are only several among many to which the principles from collaborative
reproduction might be usefully applied.
258. See Hill, supra note 12, at 373.
259. In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930).
260. See Hill, supra note 12, at 373.
261. See, e.g., Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1981)
(rejecting a natural father's petition to establish parental rights to a child conceived while the mother of the child was married to another man). The Delaware court stated that allowing the natural father standing to establish paternity would "open the door to the invasion of continuing family stability by any
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In other states, a challenge may generally only be brought by
the mother of the child or her husband.2 2
Historically, this presumption of legitimacy undoubtedly
reflected the stigma associated with sex outside marriage.
But it also served practical ends, for until very recently it
was difficult to prove fatherhood scientifically.26 3 In addition,
the presumption reduced the likelihood that children would
be abandoned, as it was probably designed to prevent a man
from denying that his wife's children were his own, rather
than to preclude others from asserting paternity.2 ' The presumption of legitimacy has held strong even where it has led
to odd results, such as the birth of a mixed-race child to a
white couple, 5 or a child born where the husband has had a
vasectomy and his wife has been having extramarital sex.266
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the presumption
of legitimacy from a social capital perspective, we apply the
three principles from collaborative reproduction. Thus the
relevant questions are: whether the presumption protects
and promotes a variety of social ties, whether the ties it protects are voluntarily chosen and whether it is a regulation of
the terms of the relationships once entered.
Starting with the second principle, it is clear that the
presumption of legitimacy regulates relationships voluntarily
entered-marriages that are freely chosen. It does not represent a coercive effort by law to force individuals into associations that they would not otherwise choose. Under the preman, whatever his motive, who may choose to claim an illicit paternity, thereby
not only endangering that stability but also refuting the time-honored presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock." Id. at 1077. The court
held that the state's interests in "promoting the marital relationship, preserving intact an existing family unit, and protecting the minor child from confusion, torn affection, and the life-long stigma of illegitimacy" trumped the father's claims. Id. at 1079.
262. See Hill, supra note 12, at 374.
263. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 123
(1977).
264. See Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777) ("[I]t is a rule
founded in decency, morality, and policy, that they shall not be permitted to say
after marriage, that they have no connection, and therefore that the connection
is spurious."). See also 1 HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS

IN THE UNITED STATES 281-82 (2d ed. 1987); Comment, The Law's Strongest
Presumption Collides with Mankind's Strongest Bond: A PutativeFather'sRight
to Establish His Relationship to His Child, 8 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 238
(1986).
265. See Hess v. Whitsitt, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1968).
266. See Walkup v. Walkup, 511 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
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sumption of legitimacy, the husband's connection to his child
is established through his voluntary relationship with the
child's mother. 6 7
Turning to the third principle, the presumption of legitimacy also regulates the terms of relationships that individuals enter. The presumption means that if a couple decides to
marry, then one result is that law will consider them both
parents of any children born. Law designates parenthood
and its responsibilities, rather than leaving it to the choice of
the couple. Law thus protects its interest in the content of
the marital relationship in a way that promotes social capital
by making both parents responsible for the support of any
children born during the marriage.
Lastly, we consider whether the presumption of legitimacy promotes a variety of social ties. Here, the answer is
less obvious. The presumption does not require an actual
biological (genetic) link to recognize a father-child relationship. Thus it does not limit parenthood to relationships with
one's proven offspring. As such, the presumption of legitimacy respects two different types of family ties, those with a
genetic basis and those without. Yet the social capital benefits of the presumption are nonetheless limited because it is
only made in a specific category of cases: where a child is
born to a married couple. This restriction means that law
fails to promote relationships in other circumstances that
warrant a similar presumption of parenthood because of the
social capital benefits. Two unmarried adults, for example,
who live together for twenty years and raise three children
are equally suitable candidates for designating parenthood as
are adults who actually marry in advance. Law's failure to
apply a presumption in the absence of marriage thus represents a loss of social capital. Consider two other examples.
In the absence of a presumption of his parenthood, an unmarried social father may feel free to walk out on his children. Alternatively, a third party might, years after the birth

267. Of course, designation of parenthood might seem coercive where it is
not wanted (such as because a child is not actually one's genetic offspring).
But, as the analysis of the model of shared parenting made clear, the critical
relationship for deciding coercion is that between adults, not relationships between an adult and a child. In that sense, then, there is no coercion because
the marriage is voluntarily entered-and may be ended at any point. See supra
note 192.
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of a child, raise a claim of fatherhood that disrupts a functioning social family. These are both instances of law failing
to protect and promote family social capital by focusing on a
narrow class of relationships rather than looking to the social
capital benefits of a variety of ties.
In short, the three principles suggest that the presumption of legitimacy serves social capital by promoting family
ties that are voluntarily entered and by protecting law's interest in the content of marital relationships. On the other
hand, the presumption of legitimacy is unwisely restricted to
children born to married couples. Law would more effectively
promote social capital if it were to extend its presumption of
fatherhood to other instances beyond the context of marriage.
B. ConstitutionalRights of Unwed Fathers
We next consider an issue related to the presumption of
legitimacy: law's treatment under the United States Constitution of the relationship of an unwed father to his natural
child.268 Again, the principles from collaborative reproduction
will be applied to consider how effectively law serves our collective interests in this area of regulation.
As one commentator notes, two critical rules emerge
from the Supreme Court's consideration of the parental
rights of unmarried men.269 First, where the mother of a
child is not herself married, a man's biological connection to
the child gives him an opportunity to establish a relationship
with the child and some procedural safeguards for that relationship.27 ° However, if the unwed father fails to form a social relationship with the child, he eventually loses all
rights. 7' The second rule (consistent with the presumption of
legitimacy) is that a genetic father has no constitutional right
to establish paternity or to seek any recognition of a relationship with the child (even where he has tried to establish such
a relationship) if the mother of the child is married to an268. These cases invoke the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121132 (1989); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
269. Hill, supra note 12, at 375-76.
270. Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
271. Id. at 376 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246).
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other man. '
In order to assess law's treatment of unwed fathers from
a social capital perspective, it is helpful to apply the three
principles we have developed to the specific cases in which
these unwed father rules have emerged. The first of these
cases, Stanley v. Illinois,"' concerned a father who had lived
with his children and their unwed mother intermittently for
eighteen years. 7 4 The father, Stanley, challenged a state
statute that conclusively presumed every unwed father was
unfit to care for his children.7 5 Upon the mother's death, application of the statute made Stanley's children wards of the
276
state without a hearing to establish his unfitness to parent.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute as a violation of
procedural due process and equal protection.17 Justice White
for the Court wrote:
[T]he interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to
this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting
economic arrangements."
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of
the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential ......

relaNor has the law refused to recognize those family
7
1

ceremony.1
tionships unlegitimized by a marriage

The Court's ruling that the state could not presumptively
deprive Stanley of his parental relationship with his children
clearly promoted social capital as measured by our three
' First, the decision represented law promoting a
principles. 79
272. Id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)). Hill concludes
that "fatherhood is a function of the confluence of three factors: the man's biological relationship with the child, his legal or social relationship with the
child's mother, and the extent of his social and psychological commitment to the
child." Id. at 381. Hill further suggests that with respect to the second factor,
"[w]hile marriage traditionally has been the most important type of relationship, ascription of paternal rights also may depend upon the type of nonmarital
relationship." Id. at 381 n.154 (citations omitted).
273. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
274. Id. at 646.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 658.
278. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
279. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
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variety of social ties. Marriage was not a necessary condition
for law to recognize and protect familial relationships. Stanley thus avoids the main shortcoming of the presumption of
legitimacy: its restriction to marital relationships. Indeed,
the Stanley court specifically noted that significant family
ties can exist in the absence of marriage, and that law should
protect such relationships.2 8 ° Secondly, the Stanley decision
represented law's protection of ties voluntarily entered.
Stanley's relationship with the children's mother was clearly
of this nature. 8 ' Third, Stanley protects law's interest in
regulating the content or terms of relationships. The Court
determined that rights and responsibilities flowed from the
existence of the relationship itself, not from any agreement
made between Stanley and the children's mother. Significantly, the absence of marriage did not remove the father
from law's focus in this regard. Stanley thus satisfies all
three principles for promoting social capital.
Two other cases involving unwed fathers are usefully
considered together. In the first, Quilloin v. Walcott,"' the
Supreme Court upheld a state statute that permitted the
adoption of an illegitimate child over the objection of the genetic father if the father had not taken steps to legitimize the
child. 83 The Court found no constitutional difficulty with allowing a mother's husband (with whom her child had lived
for most of his life) to adopt the child as his own, despite a
challenge by the genetic father.284 The Court distinguished
Stanley by using a best-interest standard, under which adoption made sense because it gave legal recognition to an established family.'
But the Court noted:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be
offended "[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup
of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for
the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the chil280. Id. at 651.
281. See generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 235, at 78 (arguing that because the psychological relationship between a child and an adult should be
central to determining parental status, the fact that a third party prevented the
formation of a relationship should make no difference).
282. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
283. Id. at 256.
284. Id. at 254-55.
285. Id. at 255.
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dren's best interest."28 6
Quilloin is, of course, the application of the presumption
of legitimacy from the point of view of the genetic father, and
so may be evaluated for its social capital benefits in the same
way that we assessed the marital presumption. Quilloin becomes more significant, though, from a social capital perspective when we consider it in conjunction with a second case,
Lehr v. Robertson.287
In Lehr, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that an unwed father had an absolute right to notice and a hearing before his child could be adopted by the mother's subsequent
husband.288 The Court focused specifically on the father's relationship with his child, noting that he had never supported
and had hardly seen the child during the two years between
the child's birth and the adoption petition. 289 The Court
wrote:
[T]he existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in
evaluating.., the rights of the parent .... Because appellant, like the father in Quilloin, has never established a
daughhis
with
relationship
substantial
ter... the ...[state statute] ... did not operate to
deny... [him] equal protection.
In Lehr , the Court made clear that a biological relationship with a child gives the father only an opportunity to be
considered a parent:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If
he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship and make
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's develop286. Id. (citations omitted). But see Hill, supra note 12, at 377 (suggesting
that because the best-interests test cannot be the basis for terminating parental rights without a showing of parental unfitness, Quilloin only makes sense as
a statement that for constitutional purposes the genetic father was not a
"parent" of the child because "[bly failing to assume any significant responsibility in the eleven years since the child's birth, the petitioner had lost, or had
never fully actualized, his status as the parent.").
287. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
288. Id. at 250.
289. Id. at 250-52.
290. Id. at 266-67.
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ment. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not
automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of
where the child's best interests lie.29'
The Court stressed, however, that the development of a
relationship can give rise to constitutional protection:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child," his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be
said that he "act[s] as a father toward his children."292
Quilloin and Lehr thus stand for the proposition that a
mere genetic tie does not give an unwed father a constitutionally-protected parental relationship with his natural
child. Only when the father develops a social relationship
with the child does parental status arise, which the Constitution protects.
This Lehr doctrine may be evaluated for its social capital
benefits using the three principles that were developed
above. First, Lehr promotes a variety of social relationships
by refusing to give preferential treatment to genetic ties. In
fact, it permits adoption over the objection of an unwed father whose sole claim is biologically-based. Second, Lehr protects and promotes relationships that people voluntarily enter. It prevents interference by a father, on the basis of his
genetic claim alone, in the familial arrangements of the child,
the child's mother and her husband who has taken on the
parenting role. An unwed genetic father only establishes his
relationship with his child through a voluntary arrangement
with the child's mother: it is the mother who allows or denies
him contact with the natural child. As such, Lehr both protects ties that are voluntarily entered and does not coerce
new relationships that would not otherwise exist. Third,
Lehr protects law's interest in the content of relationships
that people enter. In permitting the adoption of the child by
the new husband, law firmly assigns him the responsibilities
that come with fatherhood despite the existence of an absent
genetic father. Lehr thus satisfies all three social capital
principles.

291. Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
292. Id. at 261 (citations omitted).

1998]

SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social capital also benefits where Lehr protects the genetic father's parental status, for example, where he has developed a relationship with the child. In these circumstances, Lehr does not permit extinguishing some social
relationships in order that others may be created, but instead
protects a variety of social ties, including those between an
unwed father and his genetic child. Lehr satisfies the other
two social capital principles in these instances as well. It
protects voluntary connections rather than coercing the formation of new ones, since a father who has developed a relationship with his genetic child has likely had the cooperation
of the child's mother. Lehr also preserves law's interest in
the terms of relationships. Under Lehr, law determines what
an established relationship between a genetic father and his
child will mean: "the rights of the parents293are a counterpart
of the responsibilities they have assumed."
A fourth case involving unwed fathers is Michael H. v.
Gerald D.2 94 There, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute
conclusively presuming a child born to a married woman living with her husband to be her husband's child, thus prepaternity. 295
venting a third party from establishing his
Blood tests showed that the plaintiff was almost certainly the
biological father,' 96 and he was strongly committed to the
child who, along with her mother, had in fact lived with him
at various times. 97 Yet the Court refused to allow a paternity
claim, citing the common law tradition of protecting relationships that develop within the family. 99
Justice Scalia, for a four-judge plurality, wrote that for
the plaintiffs relationship with the child to create a liberty
interest it must be one that society has traditionally protected. ' 99 Scalia stated that this requires looking to "the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."30 '
As such, Scalia asserted, the issue was whether there is a
tradition of protecting the "rights of an adulterous natural fa293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983).
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 122.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989).
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ther." °' Scalia concluded that although the Constitution may
protect the opportunity for natural fathers to develop a relationship with their children, there is no right to rebut a presumption that the child is the daughter of her mother's husband."°2
Again the three principles are used to assess the Court's
decision for its social capital implications. At first blush, its
consistency with the presumption of legitimacy in the marital
context suggests that Michael H. results in the same social
capital benefits.0 ° That is, Michael H. protects family ties
apart from those that are genetic. It protects the voluntary
relationships of the mother, her husband and the child. Finally, it preserves law's interest in the content of familial
relationships by recognizing the social father as the parent.
But the particular facts of Michael H. make inappropriate
the decision's comparison to the marital presumption of legitimacy. For Michael H. did not involve a genetic father appearing out of nowhere to disrupt the familial ties of a couple
and their child. Rather, in Michael H. the genetic father had
already developed a strong relationship with his daughter
(including living with her and her mother).
With this distinction in mind, it becomes clear that Michael H. in fact fails to promote social capital, according to
the three principles. First, the decision does not protect a variety of social ties. It favors ties in the context of marriage
over other relationships even where, as in that case, ties outside the marital context are clearly significant. Scalia's focus
on the "rights of an adulterous natural father" is thus an advance restriction that undermines social capital. In other
words, the focus on marriage as a decisive element of paternity means that law fails to protect social capital even where
there is a relationship outside the marital context that is
nonetheless significant.
Second, the decision does not protect relationships that
are voluntarily entered. In Michael H., the father established his relationship with the child with the approval of her
mother.0 ' The Court, by denying his parental claim, short301.
302.
303.
capital
304.

Id. at 127 n.6.
Id. at 129.
Overall, as we saw, the presumption of legitimacy fails to promote social
because it isrestricted to the context of marriage. See supra Part IV.A.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
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circuited this voluntary connection.
Finally, the decision does not protect law's interest in the
terms of relationships. The Court refused to consider the genetic father's prolonged connection to his child in this particular case an adequate basis for the assignment of rights
and responsibilities in the absence of marriage. The decision
of the mother and the genetic father not to marry thus became determinative, removing the terms of their relationship, and that of the father and his daughter, from law's
regulation. In short, by denying a parental claim even where
there was a substantial social relationship between a genetic
father and his daughter (and her mother), the Michael H.
the value
Court failed to promote social capital by dismissing
05
of ties that occur outside the marital context.
The opinions of three other justices in Michael H. indicate how to redirect law to better promote social capital for
collective benefits. Each opinion recognizes that law should
not be restricted to protecting only certain types of social ties.
Justice Stevens, rejecting the plurality's conclusion that a
natural father could never have a liberty interest in establishing a relationship with his genetic children if conceived
while the mother was married to another man, wrote that
"enduring 'family' relationships may develop in unconventional settings.""6
Justice Brennan suggested that because there was a tradition of protecting the relationship of a parent to a child, the
Court would do better, instead of focusing exclusively on
marriage, to ask "whether the specific parent-child relationship under consideration is close enough to the interests that
we already have protected to be deemed an aspect of 'liberty'
as well."3 °7 As such, Brennan found that the genetic father
and his child had a "substantial" parent-child relationship
that the Constitution should protect,308 and that marriage

305. For this reason, the decision suffers from the same shortcoming as the
failure to extend a presumption of fatherhood beyond the marital context. See
supra Part IV.A.
306. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 133 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, however, considered the plaintiffs rights protected by
his ability to petition for visitation rights under state law (although such a petition had been denied). Id. at 136 (Stevens, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 142-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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should not be decisive in this regard." 9
Justice White argued that because the genetic father had
played an active parental role in the life of his child, there
should be a protected liberty interest in this relationship.310
Each of these three opinions in Michael H. expand law's focus beyond a particular type of relationship, decided in advance. By directing law to consider the nature of the social
tie that exists, rather than whether it fits a predetermined
category, these opinions offer an approach to the regulation
of family relationships that more successfully promotes social
capital.
C. Artificial Insemination by Donor
The final instance of legal regulation of family relationships that we assess comes, coincidentally, from collaborative
reproduction. Here, we apply the three principles for promoting social capital to evaluate an assignment of parenthood in artificial insemination using donor sperm.
Jhordan C. v. Mary K 3 involved a suit brought by a
sperm donor to establish his paternity over a child conceived
by artificial insemination. The donor had provided semen to
a woman who planned to raise the child with her female
partner. The donor maintained contact with the couple during pregnancy and then visited the child on five occasions.
The court in Jhordan C. considered the paternity claim by
applying a state statute that provided that so long as there is
physician-involvement in the insemination procedure, a
sperm donor is not the legal father.312 Since no physician had
been involved in this instance, the court proceeded to recognize the sperm donor as the child's father and awarded him
visitation rights."3
In rejecting the claim by the mother and her partner,
that granting visitation to the donor infringed on the autonomy of their family, the court emphasized the donor's rela-

309. Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 159-60 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White specifically concluded that protecting the child from the stigma of illegitimacy and preserving
the marital unit were insufficient state interests to deny the plaintiff the opportunity to establish his paternity. Id. at 161-62 (White, J., dissenting).
311. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
312. Id. at 533.
313. Id. at 534-35.
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tionship with the child:
The semen donor here was permitted to develop a social
relationship with [the mother] and [the child] as the
child's father. During [the mother's] pregnancy [the donor] maintained contact with her. They visited each other
several times, and [the mother] did not object to [the donor's] collection of baby equipment or the creation of a
trust fund for the child. [The mother] permitted [the donor] to visit [the child] on the day after the child's birth
314
and allowed monthly visits thereafter.
Applying our three principles, the court's reasoning initially appears to promote social capital. The Jhordan C.
court seems to encourage a variety of social ties: there is no
requirement of a marital relationship to sustain the connection between the donor and the child. These ties, as the court
indicated, are also ties that were voluntarily entered: the donor developed a social relationship with the child with the
consent of the mother(s). And the decision protects law's interest in the content of relationships: the donor, by virtue of
the social relationship, is recognized as the father and assigned parental rights and responsibilities. 15
Yet on closer inspection the Jhordan C. court's overall
approach is inconsistent with our three principles. It is only
because of the circumstances of this particular case that the
court gives a surface impression of protecting and promoting
social capital for collective benefits. The court's broader program does not encourage a variety of social ties at all. Instead, the court allowed the sperm donor to seek paternity
rights in this instance only because the mother of the child
was unmarried. The court made clear that were the mother
married to another man it would deny the donor's claim: "In
the case of the married woman her husband is the presumed
father.., and any outsider-including a semen donor, regardless of physician involvement-is precluded from maintaining a paternity action.

,,16

The court found no diffi-

culty with this distinction: "In the case of a married woman,
the marital relationship invokes a long-recognized social policy of preserving the integrity of marriage.""7 As such, the
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 536.
Id. at 536-38.
Id. at 536.
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 536 (1986).
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Jhordan C. court, rather than encouraging a variety of social
ties, in fact focuses on whether or not connections are
grounded in marriage. The court's recognition of a relationship between the sperm donor and the child turned on its denial that the child's mother had a relationship with any other
parental figure. Her partner, although closely involved in
raising the child, was invisible to the eyes of this court:
"Mary and Victoria contend that they and [the child] compose
a family unit and that the [donor's claim would] constitut[e]
an infringement upon a right they have to family autonomy .... But this argument begs the question of which persons comprise the family in this case ....
It is hard to imagine this court suggesting that a married
couple also "begs the question of which persons comprise the
family." As such, the Jhordan C. court's overall scheme is to
deny recognition of a sperm donor's rights, even when based
on a social relationship with the child, if there is a married
couple involved. This case, however, involving a lesbian couple, fell outside the scope of the court's overall plan, and so it
recognized paternity. Thus, it is mere accident that the
court's decision suggests an approach that preserves social
ties to promote social capital.
The Jhordan C. court would better serve our collective
interests by recognizing and protecting, in all contexts, social
relationships that are strong and meaningful. Where a significant social relationship has in fact developed between a
sperm donor and a child-as the court claimed in this casethen that relationship deserves protection, regardless of the
marital status of the social parents. And where there is only
a biological connection between a sperm donor and the child,
and no social tie, law should prevent the donor from interfering with the child's familial relationships with the social
parents, again without regard to their marital status. 19
318. Id. at 536.
319. The court's insistence that 'this case is not intended to express any judicial preference toward traditional notions of family structure," id. at 537, is
surely disingenuous. See also Patricia J. Falk, The Gap between Psychosocial
Assumptions and Empirical Research in Lesbian-Mother Child Custody Cases,
in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 131,
151 (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds., 1994) (noting that "a rapidly
growing and highly consistent body of empirical work has failed to identify significant differences between lesbian mothers and their heterosexual counterparts or the children raised by these groups. Researchers have been unable to
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The failure of the Jhordan C. court is not unusual.
Other courts, when determining the rights of lesbian couples
who split up after having jointly raised a child produced with
donor sperm, have refused to recognize as the child's parent
the mother who lacks a biological connection, and so have
denied her continued access.32 ° Such decisions are clearly
contrary to the social capital goal as measured by our three
principles, for they fail to protect a significant parent-child
relationship--one originally encouraged by the biological
mother-simply because of the particular individuals involved. In such circumstances, law fails to promote social
capital by recognizing certain types of social ties and ignoring
others. Fortunately, some courts have begun to redirect law
in this area to better serve our collective interests by protecting parent-child ties even if they lack a biological or marital basis."' Barriers, nonetheless, persist."'
establish empirically that detriment results to children from being raised by
lesbian mothers.").
320. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). The case
involved a lesbian couple who had used artificial insemination to produce a
child. The sperm was supplied by the brother of the non-biological motherwho inseminated her partner, gave the child her last name, raised the child,
and provided financial support to the child and her partner for several years.
When the couple split up, the court refused to grant the non-biological mother
visitation rights because, it found, she was not the child's parent.
321. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 475 (1995). In that case the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed a lower
court's dismissal of a custody claim by a non-biological lesbian mother but held
that the mother (as a "non-parent") would have standing to bring a suit for visitation if she could show that she had developed a parent-like relationship with
the child which had been threatened by a "significant triggering event," so as to
justify state intervention. To establish the parent-like relationship, the petitioner needed to show:
the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner's relationship with the child; ... the petitioner and the
child lived together in the same household;.., the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of
financial compensation; and.., the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the
child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.
Id. at 435-36. Establishing a "significant triggering event" required showing
that the legally recognized parent had interfered substantially with the nonparent's relationship with the child. Id. at 436.
322. Although the Wisconsin court, id., protects and promotes social capital
by recognizing a variety of ties that are voluntarily entered, and preserving
law's interest in the content of social arrangements, its test remains a sizable
barrier to recognition of the non-biological mother's relationship with the child.
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V. CONCLUSION

This article has introduced a method of legal analysis
that emphasizes the importance of social connections for
healthy communities. Under this approach, law succeeds
where it protects and promotes social capital for collective
benefit. In order to demonstrate the social capital approach
to law, we have considered the example of legal regulation of
the family. It is no small irony that during the course of contemporary debates over the family and family values, family
ties have continued to decline. That is, the intense interest
in families and their significance has not led to a revival of
family relationships that benefit our societies.
The risk, it seems, in thinking about regulating the family, is failing to see just how families matter. But by focusing
on the importance of social capital, we have seen how law can
enhance the quality of our communities as it regulates family
relationships. The social capital approach teaches that law is
more likely to benefit collective life where it protects a variety of family ties, where it promotes ties that are voluntarily
entered, and where it regulates the terms of family relationships.
If it is to benefit collective life, law needs to be freed from
the influences of superstition, romanticism and false authority. Understanding the importance of social connections is
Focusing on the actual relationship in that case suggests that, from a social
capital perspective, it deserved law's protection. The non-biological mother attended childbirth classes with her partner, named the child with her, provided
the main source of financial support for four years, lived with them both, and
spent time with the child as any parent would. The child considered the nonbiological mother his parent, expressed a desire to maintain a relationship with
her, and considered her own parents to be his grandparents. Id. at 421-22. Cf
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing adoption by lesbian partner). See generally John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and
the Family, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 911, 932-33 (1996). Robertson argues forcefully
that reproductive technologies should remind us of the value of family relationships, without regard to the particular individuals involved:
[Assisted Reproductive Technologies] remind us of the importance to
individuals and couples of having a sphere of intimacy and privacy ....
If the principle of autonomy that underlies the use of ARTs is applied to other situations of associational intimacy, the rights of gays
and lesbians to marry and to have and rear children should also be
recognized. Both involve individual choices about fundamental human
relations that define and give meaning to life .... ARTs... remind us
of how important family is to human flourishing, and hence the need
for tolerance of different ways of forming or defining families.
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critical to a society concerned with the well-being of its members and with the vitality of its neighborhoods. Legal analysis from a social capital perspective offers a way to direct law,
in its regulations of modern life, towards those common interests.

